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Abstract
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet
periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated
a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters
are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to themmost,
shifting the ex ante probability of winning away from decisions they value less
and towards decisions they value more, typically generating welfare gains over
standard majority voting with non-storable votes. The equilibrium strategies
have a very intuitive feature–the number of votes cast must be monotonic in
the voter’s intensity of preferences–but are otherwise diﬃcult to calculate,
raising questions of practical implementation. In our experiments, realized
eﬃciency levels were remarkably close to theoretical equilibrium predictions,
while subjects adopted monotonic but oﬀ-equilibrium strategies. We are lead
to conclude that concerns about the complexity of the game may have limited
practical relevance.
1 Introduction
In binary decision problems, simple voting schemes where each voter has
one vote to cast either for or against a proposal allow voters to express the
direction of their preferences, but not their strength. This remains true if
several binary decisions are taken in series, and voters are asked to cast
their vote over each, independently of their other choices.1 It is possible,
however, to elitic voters’ strength of preferences through voting mechanisms
where voting choices are linked. Casella (2002) proposed a mechanism of
this sort that has the advantage of being extremely simple: storable votes
allow each voter to allocate freely a given total budget of votes over several
consecutive decisions. Each decision is then taken in accordance with the
majority of votes cast, but voters are allowed to cast multiple votes over the
same decision, as long as they respect their budget constraint. Thus votes
function as a kind of fiat money, playing a role similar to that of transfer
payments in more familiar mechanism design problems: voters are induced
to cast more votes over those decisions they care more about, increasing their
probabilty of having their say exactly where it matters to them most. As
stressed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003), this linkage principle has broad
applicability to any voting context where the group is making more than one
decision, with the potential for substantial eﬃciency gains.2.
We are aware of no historical examples of pure storable votes institutions,
but the storable votes mechanism is related to a scheme that is not uncom-
mon: cumulative voting, where each voter distributes a fixed budget of votes
across a field of candidates in a single multi-candidate election. Storable
votes can be thought of as a version of cumulative voting applied not to a
single election with mulitple choices, but to a series of binary decisions taking
place over time.3
1If voting is optional and costly, then strength of preference is indirectly expressed
through the choice to abstain or vote (for example, Börgers, 2001). But it can be ranked
in two classes only–stonger or weaker than the cost of voting. In addition, biases will
result if the cost of voting is correlated with voters’ preferences (Campbell, 1999, Osborne,
Rosenthal and Turner, 2000).
2Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) construct more complex rules that lead to first best
eﬃciency as the number of decision problems becomes large. By a “voting context,” we
mean a committee setting where direct side payments are not possible. The standard
mechanism design literature (e.g. Crémer, d’Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet, 2000) usually
assumes unlimited sidepayments and quasilinear utility functions.
3The idea of cumulative voting has a long history (Dodgson, 1884), and has been pro-
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In Casella (2002) voters receive no initial endowment but can accumulate
a bank of votes by abstaining on the early votes. That paper discusses con-
ditions under which such a form of storable votes increases eﬃciency relative
to a standard sequence of simple (nonstorable) votes. Here we modify the
model by endowing voters with an initial stock of votes and derive theoretical
results for the extended model. But we also address a more central question.
Although the intuition behind storable votes is immediate, voters must play
a complicated dynamic game, comparing the marginal eﬀect of an extra vote
on the probability of being pivotal today to its eﬀect on the probability of
being pivotal sometime in the future, a trade-oﬀ that must depend on the
whole distribution of voting choices by all committee members. If storable
votes were to be used in practical decision-making, would voters be able to
solve the problem well enough to achieve something resembling the theoreti-
cal properties of the voting mechanism? To address this point, we conducted
a laboratory experiment.
Our most important finding is that the eﬃciency improvements predicted
by the theory were observed in the data: the realized experimental payoﬀs
tracked the theoretical predictions almost perfectly in all treatments. The
result is particularly remarkable because the choice behavior of the subjects,
on the other hand, did not replicate the theory quite as closely. Equilibrium
strategies in this game require voters to cast a number of votes that, for
each decision, is increasing in the intensity of their preferences, and take the
form of thresholds, or cutpoints, that determine how many votes to cast as a
function of valuation. While monotonicity is very intuitive and characterizes
all best response strategies with storable votes, calculating the equilibrium
thresholds is much more complex. In our data, nearly all subjects adopted
strongly monotonic strategies (with a small number of errors), but the same
cannot be said of the thresholds equilibrium values: the best fitting cutpoint
moted as a fair way to give voice to minorities (Guinier, 1994). Cumulative voting was the
norm in the Illinois Lower House until 1980, it is commonly used in corporate board elec-
tions, and in recent years has been adopted as remedy for violations of fair representation
in local elections. See Sawyer and MacRae (1962) for an early discussion of the experi-
ence in Illinois, Brams (1975) and Mueller (1989) for more theoretical surveys, Issacharoﬀ,
Karlan and Pildes (2001) and Bowler, Donovan and Brockington (2003) for descriptions of
recent experiences. Other voting mechanisms that allow strength of preferences to aﬀect
outcomes are peremptory challenges in jury selection (Brams and Davis, 1978), voting
by successive veto (Mueller, 1978 and Moulin, 1982), and, less formally, vote trading and
log-rolling (Ferejohn, 1974, Philipson and Snyder, 1996, Piketty, 1994). For comparisons
to storable votes, see the discussion in Casella (2002).
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rules varied across subject, and even the average estimated cutpoint rule was
typically diﬀerent from the equilibrium cutpoint.
The two observations - realized eﬃciency that replicates the theory and
choice behavior that does not - together suggest a robustness of the storable
votes mechanism. Monotone voting strategies must be used in order to realize
the eﬃciency gains, but monotone behavior is quite intuitive, and in real
committee settings, voters would be more experienced than our subjects. The
potential usefulness of storable votes in practical applications is a diﬃcult
policy question, but our experiment provides an encouraging initial response.
In order to account for some of the behavioral deviations from the theory,
we estimated several diﬀerent models of stochastic choice behavior. We find
that logit equilibrium provides a close description of the subjects’ strategies
and outperforms the most plausible competing models. The model not only
allows for stochastic choice, with the likelihood of errors negatively correlated
to foregone expected payoﬀ, but also endogenizes the equilibrium payoﬀ in a
way that is similar to Nash equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the theo-
retical model and its main properties; Section 3 describes the experimental
design and the theoretical predictions of the model with the parameter values
used in the experiment; Section 4 presents the results; Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
A group of n individuals meets regularly over time to vote up or down each
period t a proposal Pt, with t = 1, . . . , T . Storable votes are a multistage
voting mechanism that allows voters to allocate a given initial stock of votes
over the diﬀerent proposals. In each period, each voter casts a single regular
vote for or against proposal Pt, but in addition, voter i is endowed at time
0 with B0i bonus votes and any bonus votes cast by i in period t are added
to his regular vote in that period. The decision of how many votes to cast
is made sequentially, period by period, after each voter observes his valution
for the current proposal. Thus in the first period voter i casts 1 regular vote,
plus any number of bonus votes, bi1 between 1 and B0i , resulting in a total
vote in the first period equal to xi1 = 1+bi1. In the second period, i casts his
regular vote plus any number of bonus votes, bi2, between 1 andB1i = B
0
i−bi1,
resulting in a total vote xi2 = 1 + bi2, and so forth. Voters cast their votes
simultaneously, but once the decision is taken the number of votes that each
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member has spent–and thus the number of votes remaining–is made public.
Each period, the decision is taken according to a simple majority of votes
cast, with ties broken randomly.
Individual i’s valuation over proposal Pt is summarized by the variable vit,
drawn each period from a distribution Fit(v) defined over a support [v, v],
with v < 0 < v. A negative realization of vit indicates that individual i
opposes proposal Pt. When a proposal is voted upon, each individual i
receives utility ui equal to |vit| if the vote goes in the desired direction, and 0
otherwise. In this paper, we make several assumptions about the distribution
functions, Fit, that simplify both the theory and the laboratory environment:
(i) vit is identically and independently distributed both across periods and
across individuals; (ii) the common distribution function F (v), defined over
[−1, 1], is continuous, atomless and symmetric around 0; (iii) F is common
knowledge, and in each period each player observes his own current valuation,
vit. The realized valuations of the members of the group other than i are not
known to i, nor are i’s own future valuations.
Individuals choose each period how many votes to cast so as to maximize
the expected discounted sum of one-period utilities, where δ is the discount
factor. Given F, n,B0, T, δ, the storable votes mechanism defines a multistage
game of incomplete information, and we study the properties of the perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this game.
Because valuations are not correlated over time, the direction of one’s vote
holds no information about the direction of future preferences and cannot
be used to manipulate other players’ future voting strategies. Assuming in
addition that players do not use weakly dominated strategies, the direction of
each individual vote will be chosen sincerely: all xit votes are cast in favor of
proposal Pt if vit > 0 and all xit votes are cast against proposal Pt if vit < 0.
The game however remains complex: it is a dynamic game where preferences
are realized over time and the information over the stock of votes held by all
other members is updated each period; and it is non-stationary because the
horizon is finite. This said, the basic intuition is simple and strong: storable
votes should allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. This
intuition is reflected in the formal properties that the equilibrium can be
shown to possess.
We focus on strategies such that the number of votes each individual
chooses to cast each period, xit, depends only on the state of the game at
t, which is the profile of bonus votes each voter has still available, B =
(B1, . . . Bn), and the number of remaining periods, T − t. Hence we refer to
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(B, t) as the state of the game and denote strategies by xit(vit, B, t). Equi-
librium strategies have the following properties:
1. Monotonicity. We call a strategy monotonic if, at a given state, the
number of votes cast is monotonically increasing in the intensity of prefer-
ences, |vit|. For any number of voters n, horizon length T , and state (B, t),
all best response strategies are monotonic.
The proof is in the Appendix, but monotonicity is very intuitive: for any
number of votes cast by the other voters, the probability of obtaining one’s
favorite outcome must be increasing, if possibly weakly, in the number of
votes one casts. Hence, everything else equal, if it is optimal to cast x votes
when the valuation attached to a given decision is |v|, it cannot be optimal
to cast fewer votes than x when the valuation is higher than |v| .
2. Equilibrium. The game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrim in pure
strategies. Equilibrium strategies are monotone cutpoint strategies: at any
state (B, t) and for any voter i with ki = Bi+1 available votes there exists a
set of cutpoints {ci1(B, t), ci2(B, t), . . . , cik(B, t)}, 0 ≤ cix ≤ cix+1 ≤ 1, such
that i will cast x votes if and only if |vit| ∈ [cix, cix+1].
The existence of the equilibrium is proved in the Appendix. Once that is
established, the characterization of the equilibrium strategies follows directly
from monotonicity. If all best response strategies are monotonic, equilibrium
strategies must be monotonic, and given a fixed number of available votes
and a continuum of possible valuations, they must take the form of mono-
tonic cutpoints. The cutpoints depend on the state of the game and two
or more may coincide (some feasible numbers of votes may never be cast in
equilibrium at a given state). The equilibrium need not be unique.
The monotonicity of the equilibrium cutpoints supports our intuitive un-
derstanding of how storable votes might lead to welfare gains relative to
non-storable votes (the reference case where each voter casts one vote each
period). Very simply, by shifting votes from low to high realizations of |v|,
a voter shifts the probability of obtaining the desired outcome towards deci-
sions over which he feels more intensely. The eﬀect appears clearly, and can
be proved rigorously, in the transparent case of two voters for any arbitrary
horizon length. With more than two voters, matters are more complicated
because the number of asymmetric states–states where voters have diﬀer-
ent stocks of available votes–multiplies. In these states voting strategies
are asymmetric, and in comparing across diﬀerent voters, a larger number
of votes cast need not always correlate with stronger preferences, breaking
the link that underpins the expected welfare gains. As discussed in Casella
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(2002), and as intuition suggests, the welfare gains appear to be robust when
the horizon is long enough, and the option value of a vote suﬃciently im-
portant, or when the group is not too small. In fact, for any number of
voters and proposals, there always exists a cooperative strategy such that
the storable votes mechanism ex ante Pareto-dominates non-storable votes.
In what follows we concentrate on symmetric games where all voters are
given the same endowment of bonus votes (B0i = B
0 for all i), and consider
symmetric equilibria where voters play the same strategy when they are in
the same state.
3. Welfare. Call EV0(B0) the expected value of the game at time 0, be-
fore the realization of any valuation, when votes are storable and each voter
has a stock of B0 bonus votes, and EW0 the corresponding value with non-
storable votes. Then: (i) For n = 2, EV0(B0) > EW0 for all T > 1, with
EV0(B0)/EW0 monotonically increasing in T . (ii) Let the valuations’ dis-
tribution F (v) be uniform. Then for all n ≥ 2 and B0 > 1, there exists a
monotonic cutpoint strategy profile xCt (vit, B, t) such that EV
C
0 (B
0) > EW0
for all T > 1. (The proofs are in the Appendix.)
With two voters, equilibrium strategies always result in expected welfare
gains, relative to non-storable votes. Indeed, as shown in the Appendix,
a stronger result holds: all strictly monotonic strategies, including simple
rules-of-thumb, lead to expected welfare gains (for example, partitioning the
interval of possible intensities [0, 1] into as many equally sized sub-intervals
as the number of available votes). If the two voters choose the same rule-of-
thumb, than the result holds for each voter individually; if instead they choose
diﬀerent but monotonic strategies, then the result holds in the aggregate:
total expected welfare will be higher, although not necessarily each individual
expected welfare. With more than two voters, ex ante welfare gains can be
guaranteed by choosing cutpoints cooperatively.4
3 Experimental design
All sessions of the experiment were run either at the Hacker SSEL laboratory
at Caltech or at the CASSEL laboratory at UCLA, with enrolled students
who were recruited from the whole campus through the laboratory web sites.
No subject participated in more than one session. In each session, all subjects
4The proof in the Appendix holds for any distribution F (v) if n is even and relies on a
suﬃcient condition weaker than uniformity if n is odd.
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were initially allocated T bonus votes to spend over T successive proposals
(in addition to one regular vote for each proposal): B0i = T for all i. There
were two main treatment variables: the number of voters in a group, n; and
the number of proposals, T. Overall we considered six diﬀerent treatments:
n = 2, 3, 6 for each of two possible horizons T = 2, 3.5 The experimental
design is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Session n T Subject pool # Subjects Rounds
c1 2 2 CIT 10 30
c2 2 2 CIT 10 20
c3 2 3 CIT 10 30
c4 2 3 CIT 8 30
c5 3 2 CIT 12 30
c6 3 3 CIT 9 30
c7 6 2 CIT 12 30
u1 2 2 UCLA 16 30
u2 2 3 UCLA 20 30
u3 3 2 UCLA 21 30
u4 3 3 UCLA 18 30
u5 6 2 UCLA 18 30
u6 6 3 UCLA 18 30
After entering the computer laboratory, the subjects were seated ran-
domly in booths separated by partitions and assigned ID numbers corre-
sponding to their computer terminal;6 when everyone was seated the exper-
imenter read aloud the instructions, and questions were answered publicly.7
The session then began. Subjects were matched randomly in subgroups of n
each. Valuations were drawn randomly by the computer independently for
each subject and could be any integer value between −100 and 100 (exclud-
ing 0),8 with equal probability. Each subject was shown his valuation for
5In addition to our core treatments, we ran one session at UCLA with n = 2, T = 2
but B0i = 3 for all i. We discuss it separately, later in the text.
6We used the Multistage Game software package developed jointly between the
SSEL and CASSEL labs. This open-source software can be downloaded from
http://research.cassel.ucla.edu/software.htm
7A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is given in Appendix D.
8In the first session, c1, one subject was assigned a valuation of 0 due to a programming
error, which was corrected for later sessions. This observation is treated as missing data.
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the first proposal and asked to choose how many votes to cast in the first
election. After everyone in a group had voted, the computer screen showed
to each subject the result of the vote for their group, and the number of votes
cast by all other group members. Valuations over the second proposal were
then drawn, and the session continued in the same fashion. After T propos-
als, subjects were rematched and a new sequence of T proposals occured.
Each session consisted of 30 such sequences (rounds).9 Subjects were paid
privately at the end of each session their cumulative valuations for all pro-
posals resolved in their preferred direction, multiplied by a pre-determined
exchange rate. Average earnings were about $25.00 an hour.
The parameters of the experiment mirrored closely the theoretical model,
with the distribution F (v) uniform over [−100, 100] and, given the short time
frame of a session, we assume δ = 1. The equilibrium cutpoints relative to
the first proposal and the equilibrium eﬃciency levels are shown in Table 2,
for diﬀerent values of n (those corresponding to our experimental treatments
are in bold; the others are reported for comparison). The welfare maximizing
cutpoints are given in the last column, and the eﬃciencies at these cutpoints
are given in the next to last column.
Table 2: Equilibrium and Eﬃciency
T=2 (2 bonus votes)
n (c12, c23) sv/eﬀ nsv/eﬀ random/eﬀ sv
C/eﬀ (cC12, c
C
23)
2 (50,50) 93.7 90 60 94.4 (33,66)
3 (35,67)A, (50,50)B , (0,100)N 96.7A 96.3B97.3N 97.3 64.9 97.9 (50,100)
4 (44,56) 96.1 93.8 68.2 96.4 (38,74)
5 (50,50)B, (0,100)N 96.5B 97.1N 97.1 70.6 97.7 (56,100)
6 (45,55) 96.6 95.1 72.5 97.1 (43,82)
7 (50,50)B, (0,100)N 96.9B 97.2N 97.2 74 97.8 (58,100)
T=3 (3 bonus votes)
9With one exception: session c2 at Caltech had 20 rounds.
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n (c12, c23,c34) sv/eﬀ nsv/eﬀ ran/eﬀ sv
C/eﬀ (cC12, c
C
23,c
C
34)
2 (37,75,100) 95.3 90 60 95.9 (37,73,100)
3 (47,66,84)A, (48,66,84)B, (47,69,84)N 96.4A,B,N 97.3 64.9 98.0 (48,87,100)
4 (49,64,83) 96.4 93.8 68.2 97.3 (41,76,100)
5 (53,65,77)* 96.4 97.1 70.6 97.9 (56,100,100)
6 (54,64,76) 96.5 95.1 72.5 97.7 (45,81,100)
7 (56,65,73)* 96.6 97.2 74 98.1 (56,100,100)
* Although there are multiple equilibria in some of the second period subgames, the
diﬀerences in first period cutpoints and expected welfare disappear when cutpoints are
discretized. The experimental treatments are in bold.
The first half of Table 2 reports the theoretical predictions in the case
of 2 consecutive proposals and 2 bonus votes (T = 2). When the second
(final) proposal is put up for a vote, all remaining votes are cast; thus the
only strategic decision is how many votes to cast over the first proposal, from
a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 3.10 The equilibrium strategy is summa-
rized by the equilibrium cutpoints in the second column, indicating at which
valuations a voter switches from casting 1 vote to casting 2 (c12) and from
casting 2 to casting 3 (c23): in the case of 2 voters, for example, the two
cutpoints coincide at |v| = 50, indicating that casting 2 votes is never an
equilibrium strategy. The third column reports ex ante equilibrium expected
earnings in the storable votes game as percentage of expected earnings if
the decision were always resolved in favor of the side having the highest to-
tal valuation–our eﬃciency yardstick. As a comparison, the fourth column
reports the same welfare measure when every voter casts 1 vote (or more
generally the same number of votes) i.e. when votes are non-storable; and
the fifth when the decision is taken randomly. In the case of 2 voters then,
expected earnings are slightly less than 94% of the ex-post eﬃcient surplus
if votes are storable, 90% if votes are non-storable and 60% if the decision is
random. If voters chose their cutpoints cooperatively, the expected share of
eﬃcient surplus rises to the number in the sixth column, and the cutpoints
10For the final proposal, subjects were not given the option of using fewer than their
allocated bonus votes. They were also not given the option of voting against the proposal
when their valuation was positive, and vice versa, for any proposal.
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would be those reported in the last column (the superscript C stands for
“cooperative”). With 2 voters, the cooperative strategy is to cast 1 vote for
valuations smaller than 33, 2 votes between 33 and 66, and 3 votes above.
This strategy is not an equilibrium, and individual deviations would be prof-
itable, but if the 2 voters used this rule their expected earnings would rise to
94.4% of eﬃciency.11
A few observations are instructive. When n = 2, the equilibrium is
particularly simple: as said above, each voter should cast 1 vote if his realized
valuation over the first proposal is below the mean, and 3 votes otherwise–
he should never split his bonus votes. The equilibrium strategy is dominant:
not only is the equilibrium unique, but voters’ choices should not be aﬀected
by the other player’s strategy. Unique equilibria also hold when n equals 4
or 6, but now the equilibrium strategy is not dominant. When n is odd, the
equilibrium is not unique. For the case n = 3, if voters 1 and 2 each cast two
votes, the third voter is pivotal only if the other two voters have opposing
valuations, but in this case he is pivotal regardless of the number of votes cast,
and this is true in both periods. Thus always voting 2 (c12 = 0, c23 = 100)
is an equilibrium, and the outcome then is identical to non-storable votes.
One can see immediately that the result holds for all n odd, if T = 2. But
other equilibria exist too, the more robust being c12 = c23 = 50 (never
cast 2 votes, and switch from 1 to 3 votes at the mean valuation) which
again can be shown to exist for all n odd.12 With T = 2, there is always
an equilibrium such that the storable votes mechanism yields at least as
high expected welfare as non-storable votes. But while the eﬃciency gain is
robust when n is even, it is not when n is odd and small, where it relies on
voters selecting the equilibrium for which the two mechanisms are identical.
The reason appears clearly in the third and fourth column of the table, and
is closely dependent on the sensitivity of non-storable votes to the number
of voters. As expected, non-storable votes does reasonably well when the
number of voters is odd, but are very ineﬃcient when the number is even and
small: they improve over randomness only because they are able to recognize
unanimity, but when voters are equally split, valuations are irrelevant and
the tie-break rule determines the outcome. The eﬃciency of storable votes,
on the other hand, is quite stable over diﬀerent n: the problem posed by an
even number of voters is less severe because it does not translate necessarily
11The derivations are in Appendix A.
12Unlike in the two-player game, this strategy is not dominant.
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into a correspondingly even number of votes. But interior cutpoints can be
costly: they lead to asymmetrical votes endowments for the second proposal,
when all votes are cast independently of the intensity of preferences. As
mentioned earlier, when n is odd and small and the horizon is short, this
source of ineﬃciency can dominate the gains obtained in symmetrical states.
Figure 1 plots the theoretical expected shares of eﬃcient earnings re-
ported in Table 2 for the two cases of storable votes (the darker points) and
non-storable votes (the lighter points), for n between 2 and 11, selecting the
storable votes equilibria where the two mechanisms diﬀer (and equilibrium A
in the case of 3 voters). The storable votes curve is quite flat and bracketed
by the two very diﬀerent curves arising with non-storable votes and corre-
sponding to even and odd numbers of voters. Although not obvious from
the figure, as the number of voters increases, the storable votes mechanism
eventually dominates non-storable votes, whether n is odd or even.
The eﬃciency of storable votes can be improved by choosing the cutpoints
cooperatively, in which case, as stated earlier, the storable votes mechanism
always dominates non-storable votes in terms of ex ante welfare. In gen-
eral, the cooperative strategy has voters casting 2 votes for a larger range
of valuations than the equilibrium strategy, while casting 3 votes becomes
less likely and never occurs when n is odd. The intuition is clear for n = 3.
Ruling out 3 votes at t = 1 rules out the possibility of the two states (1, 1, 2)
and (1, 1, 3) at t = T = 2, the only states where a single voter can possibly
override the opposition of the other two. With the number of votes cast at
T not reflecting valuations, a defeat of the majority in the terminal period
is suboptimal.
The second half of Table 2 summarizes the theoretical predictions when 3
successive proposals are considered, and voters are given 3 initial bonus votes
(T = 3). We report here the equilibrium cutpoints for the first proposal only,
when voters can cast any number of votes between 1 and 4.13 Two features of
the equilibrium are worth noticing. First, although we know from the T = 2
case that some of the second period subgames have multiple equilibria, the
equilibrium cutpoints induced in the first proposal election are empirically
indistinguishable, once we constrain them to be discrete numbers (with the
exception of the 3-voter case). The same conclusion applies to expected
13The equilibrium cutpoints for the second proposal depend on the state. With the
number of possible states at t = 2 equal to 4n, we have chosen not to report the cutpoints
in the paper (with the exception of the case n = 2 which we discuss in the Appendix (see
Table B1). They are available from the authors.
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equilibrium payoﬀs: the second period multiplicity of equilibria does not
translate into detectable multiplicity in ex ante expected welfare. Second, as
one would expect when the horizon lengthens, the equilibrium cutpoints are
now strongly asymmetrical, relative to the mean valuation: voters are always
at least twice as likely to use no bonus votes than to use all 3. Still, with the
exception of the 2-voter case, there is a sizable range of valuations for which
using all bonus votes is an equilibrium, in clear contrast to the cooperative
strategy, where casting 4 votes should never occur. Indeed for n = 5 and
n = 7, the expected payoﬀ is maximized when voters cast at most 2 votes on
the first election.14
If votes are non-storable or the decision is random, lengthening the hori-
zon has no eﬀect on expected welfare, relative to the post-eﬃcient allocation:
preference realizations are independent and the one-period game repeats it-
self. The longer horizon has an eﬀect when votes are storable. For n = 2,
we have stated earlier that ex ante expected welfare cannot decrease in T ,
but in the majority of other treatments Table 2 shows it declining, if only
slightly. A similar result appears in Casella (2002) for the case n = 3, in a
diﬀerent specification of the storable votes mechanism. In that model the ef-
fect of a longer horizon is non-monotonic: after an initial decline with T = 3,
expected welfare increases with the number of proposals. We have not solved
the present model for more than 3 proposals, but the reader should not ex-
trapolate from Table 2 that increasing the number of proposals must lead to
lower expected welfare. As for the cooperative solution, moving from 2 to 3
proposals increases, in all treatments, the share of the eﬃcient surplus that
voters can expect to appropriate.15
14The cooperative strategy maximizes the expected payoﬀ taking into account the whole
path of the game. In this specific game, we can solve the problem backward, recognizing
that voters will play the appropriate cooperative strategy in any future state (but for the
last proposal, when all remaining votes are cast).
15Table 2 reports the results of the theoretical model where F (v) is continuous. We
have verified that all equilibria in Table 2 remain equilibria with the discrete distribution
used in the experimental treatment (with no probability at 0), with the following minor
corrections: (1) for T = 2, n = 6, the first cutpoint becomes 46; (2) for T = 3, n = 2, it
is 36; (3) for T = 3, n = 3, all equilibria are (48, 66, 85); (4) finally for T = 3, n = 4, the
third cutpoint is 84. All cooperative strategies remain identical.
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4 Results
Our motivation for investigating storable votes in the laboratory is that the-
ory suggests it can produce significant eﬃciency gains over standard sequen-
tial voting. Given the complex structure of the equilibrium, and the highly
strategic behavior predicted by game theory, it is not obvious that these gains
will be achieved. Therefore, we begin by presenting our results on eﬃciency.
Later we analyze individual choice behavior.
4.1 Eﬃciency
How do realized outcomes compare to the eﬃciency predictions of the theory?
The short–and perhaps surprising–answer from our data is that realized
payoﬀs match the theoretical predictions almost perfectly in all of our treat-
ments, for all group sizes and number of proposals. The theory is highly
successful in predicting both the welfare eﬀects of storable votes and its sen-
sitivity to environmental parameters.
Figure 2.1 reports realized vs. predicted eﬃciency levels in all sessions.
The horizontal axis is the ratio of the aggregate equilibrium payoﬀ to the
ex-post eﬃcient aggregate payoﬀ, using the experimental valuations. The
equilibrium payoﬀ is the payoﬀ that the subjects would have obtained had
they all played the equilibrium strategies. The vertical axis is the ratio of the
realized aggregate payoﬀ to the ex-post eﬃcient payoﬀ. Thus points on the
45◦ line represent sessions where the realized aggregate payoﬀ equaled the
theoretical prediction, and points above (below) the line are sessions with
realized payoﬀs above (below) the equilibrium expected payoﬀ. The lighter
dots are UCLA sessions and the darker dots Caltech; the larger dots are
3-proposal sessions and the smaller dots 2-proposal ones. Overall, realized
payoﬀs are remarkably close to theoretical payoﬀs. The largest deviation
from the equilibrium payoﬀ is the 3-voter 3-proposal treatment at UCLA,
but there is no evidence that the higher complexity of the 3-proposal game
results in systematically lower payoﬀs, nor does the subject pool appear to
be an important factor for aggregate eﬃciency.
The close fit of the aggregate payoﬀs to the theoretical payoﬀs could be
masking a large variance in individual payoﬀs, relative to their equilibrium
values. Figure 2.2 replicates the previous figure at the individual level (in the
absence of systematic diﬀerences, no distinction is made here between 2 and
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3-proposal treatments). As expected, the relatively small number of draws
for each individual translates into a larger range of outcomes, relative to the
ex post eﬃcient payoﬀ. There is also somewhat more dispersion around the
45◦ line, but for 87 percent of all subjects the surplus extracted is within a 5
percent range of the theoretical rate.
From a practical standpoint, the interesting question is whether the storable
votes mechanism is a desirable and workable voting mechanism, and more
concretely whether it leads to better outcomes than non-storable votes. Fig-
ure 3 plots realized aggregate payoﬀs versus aggregate payoﬀs had subjects
cast a single vote in all elections, with the realized valuations, both as share
of ex-post eﬃcient payoﬀs, and distinguishing among treatments according to
group size. In all but 3 of the 3-voter sessions, aggregate payoﬀs were higher
with storable votes. This again is in line with the theoretical predictions:
recall from Table 2 that storable votes should be superior to non-storable
votes with 2 and 6 voters, but can be inferior with 3 voters. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the Caltech session with 3 voters and 2 proposals still had higher
eﬃciency than non-storable votes.
4.2 Individual Behavior
We turn now to individual behavior in order to address the following question:
Did the theory predict outcomes so well because individuals indeed followed
the equilibrium strategies?
4.2.1 Two-proposal sessions
We begin by analyzing our data in the 2-proposal treatments (T = 2), be-
cause this is the simplest case: the only decision concerns the first proposal
and there is only one relevant state–each voter has 3 available votes. Fig-
ure 4 displays the voting behavior of a sample of subjects from 2-proposal
sessions. Each graph summarizes the behavior of one subject. The horizon-
tal axis is the (absolute) valuation of proposal 1, and the vertical axis the
number of votes cast in election 1. The dots correspond to the 30 rounds
of decision/valuation pairs for that subject. The superimposed curves in the
figure display estimated expected responses from a fitted ordered multino-
mial logistic regression model, a model we do not discuss in our main analysis
but display here to give a sense of the patterns in the data. The vertical lines
indicate the estimated cutpoints from that model.
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The figure is organized in three subclasses, according to how strictly sub-
jects followed monotonic strategies. The first subject at the very top is
perfectly monotonic: the number of votes cast at higher valuations is always
at least as large as the number cast at lower valuations. This behavior is
present in our data, but less frequent than the behavior shown in the sec-
ond subclass: subjects who are almost perfectly monotonic: the minimum
number of voting choices that would have to be changed to achieve perfect
monotonicity are very few, one or two in the examples shown here. As we
discuss in more detail below, almost perfect monotonicity is by far the most
common pattern in the data. Finally, the last subject in the figure is a rare
example of apparently erratic behavior.
Figure 4 also illustrates a second important feature of our data: mono-
tonicity is consistent with a wide range of individual behaviors. Cutpoints
need not be interior (see the subject casting (almost) only 3 votes at all
valuations), and if they are interior, they need not replicate the theoretical
equilibrium cutpoints (c12 = c23 = 50 is the dominant strategy in this treat-
ment). The most common behavior we observed in the data is followed by
the second subject in the figure: cast 1 vote at low valuations, 2 at inter-
mediate valuations and 3 at high ones (with a few monotonicity violations),
but the best-fitting cutpoints diﬀered across subjects, and clearly diﬀered
from Nash equilibrium. Thus, while monotonicity on the whole is strongly
supported by the data, Nash equilibrium behavior is not. In what follows,
we systematically explore the extent to which these features are confirmed
in the whole data set.
Monotonicity Figure 5 displays the observed frequency of the three possi-
ble voting decisions (cast 1, 2, or 3 votes) as function of (absolute) valuation
in the three treatments n = 2, 3, 6, aggregated over all sessions. We have
partitioned all draws of (absolute) valuations into bins with an equal num-
ber of sample points in each bin, and plotted the observed frequency of the
voting choice corresponding to each bin, so that the total equals 1.
In all treatments, the observed frequency of “vote 1” decisions is close
to 1 at very low valuations and approaches 0 for valuations close to 100;
the reverse is true for “vote 3” decisions, while 2 votes are mostly cast at
intermediate valuations. The frequencies are not perfectly monotonic–for
example, in the 2-voter game we observe a higher frequency of 1’s for valu-
ations between 45 and 50 than between 40 and 45 (or between 95 and 100
15
than between 80 and 85). But the apparent violations are not per se very
meaningful. Although the figure is an informative summary of the aggre-
gate features of the data, it does not allow us to read individual behavior: a
subject who always casts 3 votes, for example, follows a weakly monotonic
strategy, but could induce an apparent violation of monotonicity in the fig-
ure if he happened not to draw intermediate valuations (while a subject who
does violate monotonicity in his or her individual strategy need not induce
an upward jump in these curves if that behavior is more than compensated
by that of others).
Figure 6 shows the histograms of all individuals’ error rates for each
treatment - the minimum number of voting decisions that for each subject
would have to be changed to achieve perfect monotonicity. As a comparison,
the last histogram is obtained from a simulation where each voter cast 1, 2,
or 3 votes with equal probability at all valuations (with 21 subjects and 30
rounds). In the random simulation, only 2 voters have an error rate (just)
below 40%; in contrast, in the actual data the number of subjects with error
rates below 40% is 35 out of 36 in the 2-voter game, 30 out of 33 in the
3-voter game, and 30 out of 30 in the 6-voter game. In every session, more
than half of the subjects had error rates below 10% (i.e., 0, 1, or 2 violations
of monotonicity out of 30 decisions).
A natural question is whether subjects are learning to employ monotonic
strategies as they gain experience. Figure 7 reports the histograms of the
error rates for each treatment when the data are divided into two subsamples:
rounds 1—10 and 11—30. The error minimizing cutpoints are now calculated
separately for each subsample. In all treatments, the percentage of subjects
with error rates below 5 percent increases to at least 50% of the total in
the second subsample, although those subjects that in each treatment have
higher error rates show less evidence of learning.
This observation deserves some attention. Are the errors we observe the
result of subjects experimenting around plausible cutpoints, or do they in-
dicate some more fundamental confusion about the game? To construct a
measure of the severity of the monotonicity violations, in addition to their
number, we have calculated for each subject the minimum average error
distance (that is, the average error distance that results from cutpoints es-
timated to minimize such a distance). There is an interesting comparison
between the Caltech and UCLA subject pools, which is reproduced in Figure
8. Over all treatments, there are 2 Caltech subjects (out of 44) with average
error distance larger than 5, but there are 9 UCLA subjects, out of 55: thus,
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while we do not find any systematic diﬀerence in the behavior of the two
groups, there are some outliers in the UCLA sample. Combining the two
subject pools, on the other hand, the results are very similar to those ob-
tained from minimizing and counting error rates, and we continue to describe
the data by counting errors in what follows.16
Thresholds The data support the hypothesis of monotonic strategies. A
more diﬃcult question is whether the estimated cutpoints are consistent with
the theoretical equilibrium cutpoints. Figure 9 reports the estimated cut-
points for the three treatments and, for comparison, in the case of random
voting. The horizontal axis measures the cutpoint at which a subject switches
from 1 to 2 votes (c12), and the vertical axis the cutpoint from 2 to 3 votes
(c23); points on the diagonal correspond to strategies such that the two cut-
points coincide (never cast 2 votes). Monotonicity is built into the definition
of the cutpoints and the estimation method, and implies that all estimated
cutpoints must lie on or above the diagonal: the large number of points close
to the boundaries in the case of random voting is the result of the monotonic-
ity constraint becoming binding. The three corners of the box consistent
with monotonicity correspond to weakly monotonic strategies: the axes ori-
gin corresponds to “always cast 3 votes,” the top left corner to “always cast 2
votes,” and the top right corner to “always cast 1 vote.” The darker symbols
refer to Caltech subjects, the lighter ones to UCLA. For both subsamples
the figure shows large dispersion in the estimated cutpoint values around the
equilibrium values.17 On the other hand, relative to random voting, the esti-
mated cutpoints are closer to the center of the triangle, indicating both the
slack monotonicity constraint and a tendency towards similar probabilities
of casting 1 or 3 votes, in line with theoretical predictions.
Table 3 below summarizes the median thresholds and the median errors
rates of subjects in each of the 2-proposal sessions (a statistic we prefer to
16As shown in Figure 4, we also estimated for each subject an ordered logit model of the
number of votes cast against the (absolute) valuation. The model yields best-fit curves
and estimated cutpoints, and identifies violations of monotonicity as voting “errors.” The
results are virtually identical to those reported in the text, and in the absence of a formal
model of the theoretical error we prefer to describe the data through our nonparametric
and intuitive approach.
17For some subjects, there are multiple cutpoints that minimize the number of mono-
tonicity violations. The figure presents cutpoints estimated at the lowest value consistent
with minimizing each subject’s number of violations.
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the mean given the presence of outliers).
Table 3: Median thresholds and error rates (violations of monotonicity)
Session N T # subjects cmed12 c
med
23 errors
med
c1 2 2 10 36 68 .10
c2 2 2 10 38 58.5 .05
c7 6 2 12 32 66.5 .03
c3 3 2 12 35.5 70 .07
u1 2 2 16 37 62 .14
u3 3 2 21 38.5 73.5 .10
u5 6 2 18 29.5 65 .12
4.2.2 Three-proposal sessions
When individuals vote over three successive proposals, in the first election
everybody has the same number of bonus votes, as when there are only two
proposals. But in the second election the distribution of available bonus votes
depends on the voting decisions at t = 1, and the number of possible states
multiplies. Describing the equilibrium strategies in the second election is then
complicated, and so in fact is describing the data, because each state has to
be evaluated separately. We discuss here the data from the first election,
leaving to the Appendix the analysis of the second election in the n = 2
games, where the number of states remains small enough to be tractable.
The main features of the first election are very similar to those discussed
in the 2-proposal sessions. With very few exceptions, subjects employed
monotonic strategies, with a small number of errors, but their strategies
were more consistent across treatments than theory suggests (recall that
the equilibrium cutpoints are presented in Table 2). Figure 10 reports the
histograms of the errors (the minimum number of monotonicity violations)
in all treatments and, as a comparison, with random voting.18 With the only
exception of 1 subject in the 3-voter game, all others had lower error rates
than the minimum observed in the random voting comparison case. In all
treatments, more than half of all subjects had error rates below 10 percent
(with four possible choices, the error rate associated with random behavior
tends to 3/4 asymptotically).
18The random voting data were obtained from a simulation of 18 subjects and 30 rounds.
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Figure 11 depicts the aggregate frequency of the diﬀerent voting choices
in the three treatments. Over a large range of valuations, subjects cast 1 vote
with high probability, while they were clearly reluctant to cast 4 votes. To
some extent, these choices match the theory: for example, in 2-voter sessions
the equilibrium strategy has voters never casting 4 votes, and in 6-voter
sessions it has them casting 1 vote for a majority of possible valuations. But
equilibrium strategies diﬀer across treatments more than the data: in the 2-
voter treatments, the frequency of voting 1 seems too high, and in the 6-voter
treatments, the frequency of voting 4 too low. Because we have set B0 = T ,
by adding one proposal we have also added one bonus vote. To disentangle
what the chosen strategies owe to the longer horizon per se, we have run
a 2-proposal 2-voter session with 3 bonus votes.19 Figure 12 compares the
frequency of the voting choices in this case to the 3-proposal 2-voter sessions
(in the first election). The figure shows clearly that the length of the horizon
does matter: as theory suggests, the propensity to cast 3 and 4 votes is much
lower in the 3-proposal session. On the other hand equilibrium strategies
remain elusive: in the 2-proposal, 3-bonus votes treatment the dominant
strategy is to cast 1 vote for valuations smaller or equal to 50, and 4 votes
otherwise, a strategy we do not observe in the data.
4.3 Relationship between individual behavior and ef-
ficiency results
Given the individual behavior shown by our subjects, the eﬃciency results
presented earlier are surprisingly good. So much so, in fact, that one must
wonder whether payoﬀs could be rather insensitive to the strategies played.
What would payoﬀs have been if subjects had chosen the number of votes
to cast randomly, over their feasible alternatives, for any realized valuation?
Figure 13 compares realized aggregate payoﬀs to their expected values had
subjects randomized, again as share of ex-post eﬃciency.20 Circles are 2-
voter treatments, squares 3-voter and triangles 6-voter. In every treatment,
the payoﬀ would have been much lower.
This leave us with a puzzle. Why were the eﬃciency results so accurate,
19The session was run at UCLA with 20 subjects and 30 rounds.
20The payoﬀs from randomization are the averages over 100 realizations (where each
realization is a full 2 or 3-proposal game). Subjects always cast all their votes in the last
election.
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even though individual behavior was not only diverse, but in most cases
inconsistent with equilibrium predictions? We believe that the answer rests
with monotonicity. Storable votes can lead to eﬃciency gains because voters
can express the intensity of their preferences by casting more votes when their
valuations are higher. Even if the cutpoints are incorrect, as long as strategies
are monotonic (even with a few errors), outcomes will reflect strength of
preference and the essence of the mechanism is captured.
This conjecture can also be supported by formal argument. For the case
of 2 voters, the Appendix shows formally that the storable votes mechanism
leads to higher expected aggregate payoﬀs, relative to non-storable votes,
whenever the 2 voters follow monotonic strategies for any arbitrary value of
the thresholds, and strictly higher if at least one of the thresholds is strictly
interior. More generally, as long as strategies are monotonic, the payoﬀ
functions are rather flat at the top–the loss from not choosing the correct
thresholds is small.
Figure 14.1 illustrates this point in a graph; we have drawn it for the
more transparent case of 2 voters (and 2 proposals), but its lessons apply
to all treatments. The figure depicts individual expected isopayoﬀ curves,
when the other player follows the equilibrium strategy. The horizontal axis
is the first cutpoint (c12), the vertical axis the second (c23). Recall that the
equilibrium strategy, and hence the highest payoﬀ, corresponds to c12 = c23 =
50, the center of the square. Every isopayoﬀ contour, moving away from the
center, indicates a loss of 0.75 percentage points relative to the expected
equilibrium payoﬀ, reaching down to the non-storable votes expected payoﬀ
at the 3 corners, with a cumulative loss of slightly more than 3%. The
dots in the figure are the individual cutpoints estimated from the data and
reported earlier in Figure 9. The figure makes precise our observation about
the flatness of the expected payoﬀ function: the area corresponding to an
eﬃciency loss of less than 1% is large enough to encompass more than half
of all of our data points.
But the figures ignore a second reason for the high oﬀ-equilibrium eﬃ-
ciency of the data. As remarked in section 3, the cooperative strategy that
maximizes voters’ payoﬀs is not an equilibrium–thus joint deviations, al-
though not individually rational, can result in higher realized payoﬀs. Again,
this is easiest to see in the 2-voter 2-proposal case. In equilibrium voters
should never cast 2 votes, but the cooperative strategy dictates voting 2 for
all valuations between 33 and 66 (see Table 2), close to what we observe
in the data. Figure 14.2 represents the individual expected isopayoﬀ curve
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corresponding to the value of the equilibrium expected payoﬀ, in the same
cutpoints coordinates, when the other player is playing the (estimated) av-
erage strategy. The lowest expected payoﬀ is at the three corner points,
and again corresponds to the expected payoﬀ with non-storable votes. The
strategy c12 = c23 = 50 is dominant and thus leads once more to the highest
expected payoﬀ, but now there is a whole region of (non-equilibrium) cut-
points that yields higher than equilibrium expected payoﬀ. Two thirds of
our estimated cutpoints (25 out of 36) belong to the region.
The bottom line of the analysis is clear. The eﬃciency gains from storable
votes appear to be robust with respect to deviations from equilibrium strate-
gies, provided that subjects are using monotone cutpoints. The next section
explores more deeply the deviations from equilibrium behavior by investigat-
ing several alternative models of aggregate behavior that allow for random
variations from monotone cutpoint strategies.
4.4 Quantal response equilibrium
The results above show that the basic monotone structure of strategies is
reflected in the data, but there are some clear violations of the theoretical
predictions. We see some nonmonotonicities for nearly every subject in ev-
ery treatment, most estimated cutpoints diﬀer from their equilibrium values,
and there is little support even for the dominant strategy in the simplest
treatment (the 2-proposal, 2-voter scenario where bonus votes should never
be split). All these features are inconsistent with the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the game.
In this section we estimate a stochastic choice model of behavior. While
a standard procedure such as logit or probit is a reasonable first step (and
we have used it for descriptive purposes in some of our figures), it is not
completely adequate in the context of strategic games. The reason is that
stochastic behavior by one player changes the other players’ expected pay-
oﬀs from diﬀerent strategies (even with dominant strategies), and therefore
can change the equilibrium. Moreover, even if stochastic behavior does not
change players’ best responses, in standard models of stochastic choice (such
as logit) it will still aﬀect the predicted stochastic choices of the other play-
ers, because it changes their expected payoﬀs. Only in a stochastic choice
model where choice probabilities are unresponsive to payoﬀs would this in-
teraction eﬀect not be present. Therefore, what is needed is a more elaborate
model that incorporates not only stochastic choices, but also the endogenous
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equilibrium eﬀects.
Quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1996, 1998)
is a model that embodies stochastic choice into the standard noncooperative
game approach. It solves the problem of stochastic choice interactive eﬀects
by looking at an equilibrium in which players’ choices react stochastically to
expected payoﬀs, while (in equilibrium) the expected payoﬀs are themselves
a function of the stochastic choice behavior of the other players. This results
in a generalization of Nash equilibrium to allow for stochastic choice.
For a finite n-player game, let Ki be the number of strategies available
to player i. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ be a mixed strategy profile, and let
ui : S → R be i’s payoﬀ function. Denote by Uik(σ) the expected payoﬀ to
player i from using strategy k, when the other players are using profile σ−i
and let Ui(σ) = (Ui1(σ), . . . , UiKi(σ)). We define a quantal response function
as a mapping from utilities into choice probabilities, that is a function that
maps Ui(σ) into a Ki−vector of choice probabilities for player i. As is typical
in applications we require such a function, Qi(Ui) = (Qi1(Ui), . . . , QiKi(Ui)),
to be interior, continuous, and payoﬀ responsive (see McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995, for details).21 Interiority requires Qij(Ui) > 0 for all i, j, Ui ∈ RKi.
Continuity requires Qi(Ui) to be continuous for all i, Ui ∈ RKi. Payoﬀ
responsiveness requires: (1) Uij > Uik → Qij(Ui) > Qik(Ui) for all i, j,
Ui ∈ RKi; and (2) Qij(Ui) is weakly increasing in Uij for all i, j. A quantal
response equilibrium (QRE) is a strategy profile σ∗ = ( σ∗1, . . . , σ
∗
n) ∈ Σ such
that Qi(Ui(σ∗)) = σ∗ for all i.
4.4.1 Logit equilibrium
For estimation, we use a parametric version of QRE, logit equilibrium, which
is the extension of the standard logit choice model to multiperson strategic
choice problems. A logit equilibrium is a quantal response equilibrium in
which the quantal response function is given by the standard logit response
function below:
Qij(Ui) =
exp(λUij(σ))PKi
k=1 exp(λUik(σ))
, (1)
where the parameter λ governs the degree of payoﬀ responsiveness. When
λ = 0, strategies are completely unresponsive to payoﬀs, and player i simply
21Such response functions can be rationalized as a Bayesian equilibrium of a game of
incomplete information with privately observed i.i.d. payoﬀ perturbations.
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chooses each strategy with probability 1/Ki. When λ = ∞, players choose
best responses, and the logit equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium.22
Therefore, we can write a logit equilibrium as any strategy profile σ∗ =
(σ∗1, . . . , σ
∗
n) ∈ Σ such that:
σ∗ij =
exp(λUij(σ∗))PKi
k=1 exp(λUik(σ
∗))
for all i,j.
As λ is varied over [0,∞), one traces out the logit equilibrium correspondence,
that is, the set of solutions to (1). This correspondence is upper hemicontin-
uous and its limit points, as λ tend to∞, are Nash equilibria. In this paper,
we consider the logit equilibrium correspondence of the storable votes game.
Because of computational diﬃculties, we apply the logit equilibrium model
only to the 2-proposal treatments.23
We study two representations of the logit equilibrium, corresponding to
two diﬀerent models of strategy choice in the storable votes game. In one
representation, strategies are behavior strategies: a player must consider how
many bonus votes to use conditional on his valuation (and, in later stages of
the game, on the history of voting on past proposals). In this case, we apply
the logit model to each discrete choice (0, 1, or 2 bonus votes) conditional on
the player’s (absolute) valuation. Each player’s strategy is characterized by
100 probability distributions over 0, 1, or 2 bonus votes, one for each possible
(absolute) valuation. In the second representation, we suppose players are
choosing ex ante, among the set of (weakly) monotone cutpoint strategies,
before drawing valuations.24 A monotone cutpoint strategy is a pair: given
100 possible valuations, there are 5050 distinct monotone strategies, and a
logit equilibrium will be represented as a probability distribution over all
of these cutpoint strategies. While the Nash equilibria are identical for the
two representations, the logit equilibrium correspondences are quite diﬀerent.
22In most applications, it is assumed that λ is identical for all players, but this is not
necessary. Heterogeneity with respect to λ has been explored in McKelvey, Palfrey, and
Weber (2000).
23Quantal response equilibrium (and logit equilibrium) has also been defined for
Bayesian games with continuous types (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996), games with con-
tinuous strategy spaces (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1997), and games in extensive form
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998). The storable votes game described in the theoretical sec-
tion combines all of these elements. In the experiment however, strategies and types are
finite, and we use the standard model in the estimation that follows.
24Therefore the cutpoint model is a logit equilibrium of the game with a restricted set
of strategies.
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Moreover, any logit equilibrium will imply a specific probability distribution
over actions (i.e., number of bonus votes used in the first proposal) as a func-
tion of absolute valuation. As we see below, these probability distributions
diﬀer quite a bit depending on the representation of strategies we use.
4.4.2 QRE estimation
Because the logit equilibrium implies a probability distribution over actions,
we can use it as a model to fit the data, by estimating the response parameter,
λ, through standard maximum likelihood estimation. The derivation of the
likelihood function is described in Appendix C. Table 4 presents the results
of the estimation: the estimates for the behavior strategy model and the
cutpoint strategy model are reported in columns 5 and 7, respectively, and
the corresponding values of the log-likelihood function at the estimated value
of λ are reported in columns 6 and 8, respectively.
Several observations can be made. First, the data are generally noisier in
the UCLA subject pool, a fact reflected in both the value of the likelihood
function and the estimated λ under both models, but especially under the
cutpoint model. Second, the cutpoint model generally fits the data better in
both subject pools, although the diﬀerences are not significant in two of the
UCLA sessions. Third, bλcut < bλbeh in every session, a sensible result given
that bλcut has some additional “rationality”built into it: even with λcut = 0,
players are still using monotone cutpoints (randomizing over all such mono-
tone cutpoint strategies with equal probability), and hence the predicted
choice behavior is highly responsive to valuation, as in the data. In contrast,
if λbeh = 0, choice behavior is completely random, and independent of val-
uation. Fourth, the estimated value of λ for both models is increasing in
n. We do not have a good explanation for this, but it is an interesting and
persistent finding.
Table 4: Results of logit equilibrium estimation
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Session N T # obs bλbeh − lnLbeh bλcut − lnLcut
c1∗ 2 2 299 0.46 181 0.25 162
c2 2 2 200 0.52 108 0.32 102
c5 3 2 360 0.81 248 0.37 248
c7 6 2 360 1.66 203 0.84 200
u1 2 2 480 0.19 437 0.00 438
u3 3 2 630 0.56 520 0.01 521
u5 6 2 540 1.10 390 0.30 380
Figures 15 and 16 show the implications of the QRE model for the proba-
bility distribution of votes as a function of (absolute) valuation, for the behav-
ior strategy model as well as the cutpoint strategy model. Figure 15 shows,
for session c1, the expected number of votes using the estimated value of bλbeh
(0.46) and bλcut (0.25). The darker curve corresponds to behavior strategies,
the lighter one to cutpoint strategies. The data are superimposed, and each
dot represents the empirical average number of votes, as function of absolute
valuation. >From this graph, it is clear that there is not much diﬀerence
between the models in terms of expected number of votes cast.
However, the estimated distribution of votes cast is quite diﬀerent in
the two models. This is shown in Figure 16, which displays the relative
frequencies of casting 1, 2, or 3, votes as function of valuation for each session
and for both QRE models. For each session, the graph on the left is for
behavior strategies, and the one on the right is for cutpoint strategies. In
each graph, the horizontal axis is absolute valuation, which ranges between
1 and 100, and the vertical axis is choice probability, and ranges from 0 to 1.
For each valuation, the two curves in the graph partition the [0, 1] interval
into three subintervals, with the size of these subintervals corresponding to
the probability of casting exactly 1, 2, or 3 votes, respectively. Each graph
is, for each session, the estimated version of Figure 5.
This figure illustrates quite clearly the implications of the estimates in Ta-
ble 4. First, observe that the third graph in the second column corresponds
to the cutpoint model estimates for n = 2, T = 2 when λ = 0.25 These are
25The fifth graph in the same column is very similar, since the estimated value of λ is
0.01.
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the predicted frequencies if behavior is monotone, but no additional rational-
ity is assumed–players randomize over all monotonic cutpoints. Behavior
remains regular, with the probability of casting 1 vote approaching 1 for low
valuations, the probability of casting 3 votes approaching 1 for high valua-
tions, and the probability of casting 2 votes increasing as valuations approach
50 (from either direction). Second, observe that in all cases the curves for
UCLA sessions are flatter than the corresponding curves for Caltech sessions,
reflecting the fact that bλUCLA < bλCIT in all sessions and for both models.
Third, for intermediate ranges of v, the probability of casting exactly 2 votes
(the vertical distance between the two curves) is higher in the cutpoint model
than in the behavior strategy model. This is one reason for the better fit of
the cutpoint model.
4.4.3 Non-QRE models of stochastic choice
How well do our two logit equilibrium models fit the data compared to other
plausible models? In addition to allowing us to better evaluate the results just
described, the relative fit of the diﬀerent models will help us to understand
better the properties of the data, and hence the behavior of the subjects.
Although we must acknowledge the heterogeneity revealed by our earlier
description of the data, for consistency with the QRE estimations we limit
ourselves to aggregate models that assume homogeneous behavior on the part
of the players.26
We study three alternative models. In the first model, which we refer to
as aggregate best fit (ABF), all players are assumed to use monotone strate-
gies with an error rate that is not payoﬀ dependent. The cutpoints are
constrained to be the same for all players and are estimated from the data.
While the model is almost completely atheoretical (except to the extent that
it assumes monotone behavior), it provides both the most natural bench-
mark and a particularly challenging comparison to QRE, which is instead
based on a theoretical structure of equilibrium behavior. For each session,
we estimate three parameters: two cutpoints, c12, c23, and the error rate,
. The second model is a variation on the Nash equilibrium that allows for
errors, but (like the cutpoint models) assumes that errors are unrelated to
equilibrium expected payoﬀs: individuals are assumed to choose their Nash
equilibrium strategy with some probability, and randomize otherwise. In
26Both QRE models we estimated assume that all subjects’ (mixed) strategies are iden-
tical and all subjects share the same value of λ.
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contrast to QRE, the randomization is not taken into account by the other
players, so the model is not quite an equilibrium model. We call this the
noisy Nash equilibrium (NNE) model. It has been investigated in other con-
texts and typically fits data better than Nash equilibrium but worse than
logit equilibrium. Finally, we consider a constrained ABF model where sub-
jects are all assumed to use, with some error, what we call “uniform cutpoint
strategies.” That is, they are assumed to adopt monotone cutpoint strategies
that follow a simple rule of thumb: the range of possible valuations is divided
in intervals of equal size so that each possible strategy has the same probabil-
ity ex ante. In the case of T = 2, this corresponds to c12 = 33 and c12 = 66.
Thus with some probability subjects vote according to these cutpoints, and
with some probability they randomize. The likelihood function for the ABF
model is given in appendix C, and the likelihood functions for the other two
models are derived in a similar way. The results of the estimation of these
alternative models are presented in the table below:
Table 5: Alternative models
S n obs ABF QREcut QREbeh 33/66 NNE
c12 c23 b −lnL λ −lnL λ −lnL b −lnL b −lnL
c1 2 299 38 70 0.20 191 0.25 162 0.46 181 0.24 217 0.32 253
c2 2 200 40 65 0.16 108 0.32 102 0.52 108 0.21 132 0.27 154
c5 3 360 38 68 0.25 267 0.37 248 0.81 248 0.29 287 0.36 323
c7 6 360 41 67 0.20 228 0.84 199 1.66 203 0.21 238 0.30 293
u1 2 480 39 63 0.33 416 0.00 438 0.19 437 0.36 436 0.45 478
u3 3 630 39 74 0.30 520 0.01 521 0.56 520 0.36 569 0.43 621
u5 6 540 32 65 0.26 411 0.30 380 1.10 390 0.27 420 0.40 517
4.4.4 Discussion of estimation results
Table 5 indicates that both QRE models do much better than NNE–NNE is
easily rejected. This is not really surprising, in light of the earlier description
of the data, and the estimation confirms our reading of the data. More
unexpected is the inferior performance of the 33/66 model, which does much
worse than either QRE model (with the exception of session u1, which all
models fit the worst, probably due to a few outliers). Both QRE models do
much better than ABF in the Caltech data; ABF does better in one UCLA
session, but again it is the one session where no aggregate model fits well.
27
This is the most surprising result: it would seem that ABF must outperform
nearly any aggregate model, since, by definition, it estimates the cutpoints
that best fit the data. However, while the QRE estimated cutpoints place
an additional constraint on behavior (equilibrium), QRE, unlike ABF, allows
errors to be correlated with expected payoﬀs rather than just assuming all
errors are equally likely. The QRE parameter, λ, is, loosely speaking, an
indicator of this correlation. Thus, for example, if vki1 ∈ (0,bc12], and thus
no bonus votes should be cast, the logit equilibrium likelihood function will
assign a lower likelihood to bki1 = 2 than it assigns to b
k
i1 = 1, since b
k
i1 = 2
yields lower expected utility than bki1 = 1. In contrast, the ABF likelihood
function assigns the same likelihood to both of these observations. In the
data, it is clearly the case that errors are related to expected payoﬀs.27
All of these models are aggregate models in the sense that individuals are
treated as representative agents. Using the approach of the earlier section,
where one obtains a best fit separately for each subject, one could improve
significantly over all of the representative agent models.
Finally, we note that all of the models considered fit Caltech sessions
better than UCLA sessions. There is more unexplained variation in the
UCLA data, in part at least because of the presence of more outliers in the
UCLA data.
5 Conclusions
The results of the experiment suggest several conclusions. First, the eﬃciency
calculations based on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium model of behavior
predicts almost perfectly the aggregate surplus for all treatments. This con-
clusion holds true across subject pools, across time, and across the various
parametric environments.
Second, monotone cutpoint strategies, with some random deviation, ap-
pear to be used by the vast majority of subjects, again in all treatments and
in both subject pools. Monotone behavior characterizes all best response
strategies of the storable votes mechanism, but it is also highly intuitive:
“use more bonus votes if your preferences over the current proposal are more
intense.” Moreover, it is monotone behavior that leads to the welfare find-
27In addition, the QREcut model implicitly allows for some heterogeneity in the data,
since diﬀerent players are using diﬀerent cutpoints in each round. The QREbeh model does
not have an interpretation in terms of heterogeneity of cutpoints.
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ings. The eﬃciency gains from storable votes, compared to nonstorable votes,
derive from the ability of voters to shift the probability of obtaining their de-
sired outcome towards those decisions that weigh more in their utility. This
happens precisely because subjects use monotone strategies.
Third, the cutpoint strategies, while typically monotone, are significantly
diﬀerent from the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies, a fact we read as
evidence of stochastic choice. We fit the a logit equilibrium model to the
data for all treatments, with two alternative representations of the subjects’
strategies, one that allows for all possible behavior strategies, and one that
assumes monotone cutpoint strategies. We compare their fit to three alterna-
tive models : a noisy Nash model where Nash equilibrium strategies obtain
with random errors, a uniform strategy model where monotone cutpoints are
such that feasible voting choices are all assigned equal ex ante frequency,
again with random errors, and a purely statistical model where aggregate
cutpoints are directly estimated from the data by minimizing monotonicity
violations. The qualitative and quantitative features of the data are best
organized by the logit equilibrium model, underscoring the importance of
modeling errors as negatively correlated with foregone payoﬀs.
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Appendix
A Theoretical properties of the model
A.1 Monotonicity
Call Pr(w|x) the probability that i obtains the desired decision over the
current proposal (“wins”) when casting x votes. For any number of voters n,
Pr(w|x) must be monotonically (if possibly weakly) increasing in x. Given
the valuation |vit|, i’s expected utility from casting x votes equals EUit =
u(|vit|)Pr(w|x) + δEVit+1(bit+1, EB−i,t+1), where bit+1 = bit − x + 1. Call x0
(x00) the number of votes cast by i when |vit| = v0 (v00), with v0 > v00. By
definition of best response, the following two inequalities must hold:
u(v0)Pr(w|x0) + δEVit+1(bit − x0 + 1, EB−i,t+1) ≥
u(v0)Pr(w|x00) + δEVit+1(bit − x00 + 1, EB−i,t+1) (a1)
u(v00)Pr(w|x00) + δEVit+1(bit − x00 + 1, EB−i,t+1) ≥ (a2)
u(v00)Pr(w|x0) + δEVit+1(bit − x0 + 1, EB−i,t+1).
Adding inequalities (a1) and (a2) yields,
(u(v0)− u(v00))(Pr(w|x0)− Pr(w|x00)) ≥ 0. (a3)
But with v0 > v00 and u(v0) > u(v00), and given that Pr(w|x) is monotonically
increasing in x, inequality (a3) implies x0 ≥ x00, as stated in the text.
A.2 Existence of equilibrium
The proof in Casella (2002) shows that the game satisfies the conditions
required by Milgrom and Weber (1985) for existence of an equilibrium in
distributional strategies. Hence an equilibrium exists, and all equilibrium
strategies are indistinguishable from pure strategies.
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A.3 Welfare
(i) Equilibrium welfare gains for n = 2. Call Egi(B, t) the expected one-
period utility to player i in state (B, t) before the realization of his prefer-
ences (we reserve the notation Eui(B, t) for expected one-period utility after
the realization of player i’s preferences). Hence EVi(B, t) = Egi(B, t) +
δEVi(Bt+1, t+1). The proof proceeds identically to the proof of Proposition
3 in Casella (2002), but the expressions for Egi(B, t) are slightly diﬀerent,
and we repeat the main steps here. The idea is to break down the ex ante
expected value of the game into the one-period expected utilities associated
with all possible states. We can show that if the state is symmetrical (B = b)
the one-period expected utility cannot be lower than when votes are non-
storable; if the state is asymmetrical (B = {bi, dj}, b 6= d) the result holds
on average, for the sum of the one-period utilities in the two mirror-image
asymmetrical states. But starting from a symmetrical initial endowment of
votes, the probability of reaching either of the two mirror-image asymmet-
rical states must be identical, hence this is suﬃcient to establish the result.
More formally, we can prove that in equilibrium EV0(b) > EW0 for all T > 1
by showing that the following two lemmas hold:
Lemma 1. (i) Egi(B, t) +Egj(B, t) ≥ 2W for all B, t
(ii) Eg(b, t) > W at t = T − 1
Lemma 2. Suppose the following inequalities hold at t+1:
(i) EVi(Bt+1, t+ 1) +EVj(Bt+1, t+ 1) ≥ 2Wt+1
(ii) EV (b, t+ 1) > Wt+1.
Then they must hold at t.
Given monotone cutpoint strategies, in symmetrical states the model de-
scribed in this paper yields:
Egi(b, t) =
Z c1(b,t)
0
u(v)dF (v) (1/2 + F (c1(b, t)))+Z c2(b,t)
c1(b,t)
u(v)dF (v) (F (c1(b, t)) + F (c2(b, t))) + .. (a4)
..+
Z 1
ck−1(b,t)
u(v)dF (v) (F (ck−1(b, t)) + 1) .
where 0 ≤ cx(b, t) ≤ cx+1(b, t) ≤ 1 for all t, for all x ∈ {1, .., b − 1}. In
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asymmetrical states:
Egi(B, t) +Egj(B, t) =
Z a1(B,t)
0
u(v)dF (v) (1/2 + F (β1(B, t)))+
+
Z a2(B,t)
a1(B,t)
u(v)dF (v) (F (β1(B, t)) + F (β2(B, t))) + ..
+
Z 1
ak−1(B,t)
u(v)dF (v)
¡
F (βk−1(B, t)) + F (βk(B, t))
¢
+ (a5)
+
Z β1(B,t)
0
u(v)dF (v) (1/2 + F (a1(B, t)))+
+
Z βk
βk−1(B,t)
u(v)dF (v) (F (ak−1(B, t)) + 1) +
Z 1
βk(B,t)
2u(v)dF (v).
where B = {bi, dj}, b < d, and {a1, .., ak−1} are the equilibrium thresholds
for voter i and {β1, . . . , βk} for voter j, with 0 ≤ ax ≤ ax+1 ≤ 1, for all
x ∈ {1, . . . , bi − 1} and 0 ≤ βx ≤ βx+1 ≤ 1, for all x ∈ {1, . . . , bi} (voter j
never casts more than bi + 2 votes).
Lemma 1 can then be proved by manipulating equations (a4) and (a5),
exactly as in Casella (2002); Lemma 2 is identical to Lemma 2 in Casella
(2002) and is proved there. Once the two lemmas are established, the result
follows immediately: because all votes are cast at T , EVi(B, T )+EVj(B, T ) =
2W for all K; hence in all symmetrical equilibria at T − 1, EV (b, T − 1) =
Eg(b, T−1)+δW > WT−1 by Lemma 1; but then by Lemma 2 the inequalities
hold at all previous times t, and in particular EV0(b) > EW0 for all T > 1.
The two lemmas also imply that EV0(b)/EW0 cannot be decreasing in T :
intuitively, a longer horizon corresponds to larger number of nodes in the
game tree, all of which are associated with expected one period utilities for
the pair of players that are not smaller than the expected utilities with non-
storable votes.
The proofs of the two lemmas rely on the monotonicity of the cutpoints
and on a notion of symmetry–the two voters choosing the same cutpoints
at the same state. But the proof does not rely on the cutpoints equilibrium
values. The implication is that if the symmetry condition is satisfied, any rule
of thumb that results in monotonic cutpoints yields expected welfare gains,
relative to non-storable votes, for each voter. If symmetry is not satisfied
but monotonicity is, then the expected utilities associated with any state are
given by equation (a5) with the small amendment that cutpoints need to be
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included for all feasible number of votes. The first part of Lemma 1 still
follows, with the result that the aggregate expected value of the game, for
the two voters taken together, cannot be lower than the aggregate expected
value with non-storable votes.
(ii) The cooperative strategy.Consider the following strategy. At any t
up to T − 2, each voter casts only a regular vote, and at T − 2 each casts
B0 − 2 bonus votes, in addition to the regular vote. Since every individual
is casting the same number of votes, the game is identical to non-storable
votes, with identical expected welfare up to T − 1. Consider now the last 2
periods, which each voter enters with 2 bonus votes. In period T − 1, call α
a cutpoint such that all voters spend 1 bonus vote for (absolute) valuations
above α and none for valuations below; in period T all remaining votes are
cast. Thus,
EVT−1(α) = 2
Z α
0
u(v)dF (v)Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 1)+
+2
Z 1
α
u(v)dF (v)Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2) + δ2
Z 1
0
u(v)dF (v) (a6)
[(2F (α)− 1)Pr(wT |xT = 3) + 2(1− F (α))Pr(wT |xT = 2)],
where Pr(wt|xt = x) is the probability of obtaining the desired outcome
(winning) at t when casting x votes (and the 2 in front of each term reflects
the two sides of the distribution). If α = 0, all voters cast 1 bonus vote in
each of the last 2 elections, and the whole game is then identical to non-
storable votes. We show here that there always exist values of α > 0 such
that EVT−1 > EWT−1 and hence EV0 > EW0.
Consider the derivative of (a6) with respect to α, evaluated at α = 0:µ
∂EVT−1(α)
∂α
¶
α=0
= 2
Z 1
0
u(v)dF (v)
µ
∂(Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
+
2δ
Z 1
0
u(v)dF (v)[2f(0)[(Pr(wT |xT = 3))α=0 − (a7)
Pr(wT |xT = 2)α=0 +
µ
∂Pr(wT |xT = 2)
∂α
¶
α=0
].
We begin with the case of n even. Call r(n) the probability of winning when
everybody casts the same number of votes, and consider voter i’s probability
of winning at T − 1. If everybody casts 2 votes, i’s probability of winning is
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r(n); if one voter casts a single vote, i’s probability of winning diﬀers from
r(n) only if n/2 voters disagree with his or her preference–in this case, i
wins if the “single voter” is on the other side and loses if on i’s side, whereas
the result is always a tie when each player casts two votes. Thus we can
write,
Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2)n even = (1− p1)n−1r(n)+ (a8)
(n− 1)p1(1− p1)n−2
·
r(n)− (1/2)n
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶
+ (1/2)n−1
µ
n− 2
n
2
− 1
¶¸
+ p21[.....],
where p1 = F (α)− 1. The last term in (a8) refers to scenarios where at least
2 voters cast a single vote, and because all terms in (a7) must be evaluated
at α = 0, will be set to zero after diﬀerentiation. Thus:µ
∂Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2)
∂α
¶
α=0
n even
= (n−1)(1/2)n−12f(0)
µµ
n− 2
n
2
− 1
¶
− 1/2
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶¶
.
(a9)
Consider now the problem at T , where the probability of casting 3 votes
equals the probability of casting 1 vote at T−1. If everybody casts 2 votes, i’s
probability of winning is again r(n); if one voter casts 3 votes, i’s probability
of winning diﬀers from r(n) only if n/2 voters disagree with his preference–
in this case, i loses if the “triple voter” is on the other side and wins if is on
i’s side. We can write
Pr(wT |xT = 2)n even = (1− p3)n−1r(n)+ (a10)
(n− 1)p3(1− p3)n−2[r(n)− (1/2)n
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶
+ (1/2)n−1
µ
n− 2
n
2
¶
] + p23[.....],
where p3 = 2[F (α)− 1/2]. It follows thatµ
∂(Pr(wT |xT = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
n even
= (n− 1)(1/2)n−12f(0) (a11)µµ
n− 2
n
2
¶
− 1/2
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶¶
.
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We can simplify the binomial terms and conclude:,µ
∂(Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
n even
= (1/2)n
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶
2f(α) = (a12)
= −
µ
∂(Pr(wT |xT = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
n even
,
which is the result intuition suggested. With δ ≤ 1, it follows then that
(a7) must be strictly positive if (Pr(wT |xT = 3)− Pr(wT |xT = 2)) is strictly
positive, when everyone else casts 2 votes. With n even , we see immediately
that the condition is satisfied: by casting 3 votes, i can resolve in his favor
all decisions that would have resulted in ties:
[Pr(wT |xT = 3)− (Pr(wT |xT = 2)] α=0
n even
= (1/2)n
µ
n− 1
n
2
¶
. (a13)
It follows that (a7) must be strictly positive: since EVT−1 = EWT−1at α = 0,
there exists some postive α such that EVT−1 > EWT−1and thus EV C0 (B
0) >
EW0 for all T > 1, establishing the result.
Consider now n odd. When everybody else casts 2 votes, i’s probability
of winning cannot be increased by casting 3 votes: if ignoring his vote the
two sides are tied, any vote by i breaks the tie; if the two sides are not tied,
the minimum diﬀerence is of 4 votes, and i’s vote can make no diﬀerence,
whether he casts 2 or 3 votes. The first observation then is
[Pr(wT |xT = 3)− (Pr(wT |xT = 2)] α=0
n odd
= 0. (a14)
A similar problem emerges as we sign the derivatives in (a7). If the other
voters are split equally, (n − 1)/2 on either side, voter i can always tilt the
vote, whether they all cast 2 votes, or there is a single voter who casts either
1 or 3 votes, but he cannot do so if (n− 1)/2 + 1 are on the opposing side:
Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2)n odd = (1− p1)n−1r(n) + (n− 1)p1(1− p1)n−2r(n) + p21[.....]
Pr(wT |xT = 2)n odd = (1− p3)n−1r(n) + (n− 1)p3(1− p3)n−2r(n) + p23[.....].
Therefore,µ
∂(Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
n odd
= 0 =
µ
∂(Pr(wT |xT = 2))
∂α
¶
α=0
n odd
. (a15)
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It follows then that (∂EVT−1(α)/∂α)α=0 = 0 when n is odd. To extend
to this case the logical argument made for n even, we need to evaluate the
second derivative of (a6), evaluated at α = 0: establishing that α = 0 is a
local minimum (when n is odd) is suﬃcient to prove the existence of welfare
improving strategy. Substituting the terms that, with n odd, we know to be
zero, we can write,µ
∂2EVT−1(α)
∂α2
¶
α=0
n odd
= 2
Z 1
0
u(v)dF (v)
µ
∂2(Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2))
∂α2
¶
α=0
n odd
+
(a16)
+2δ
Z 1
0
u(v)dF (v)4f(0)
µµ
∂Pr(wT |xT = 3)
∂α
¶
+
µ
∂2Pr(wT |xT = 2)
∂α2
¶¶
α=0
n odd
.
We can follow the same procedure as above, noting that in evaluating the
second derivatives we must now account for the possibility that at most 2
voters cast a single vote at T − 1 (and thus 3 votes at T ). It is not diﬃcult
to derive,µ
∂(Pr(wT |xT = 3))
∂α
¶
α=0
n odd
=
(n− 3)(n− 2)
n+ 1
(1/2)n−1
µ
n− 3
n−3
2
¶
2f(0) (a17)
µ
∂2(Pr(wT−1|xT−1 = 2))
∂α2
¶
α=0
n odd
= (n− 2)(1/2)n−1
µ
n− 3
n−3
2
¶
2f(0) (a18)µ
∂2(Pr(wT |xT = 2))
∂α2
¶
α=0
n odd
=
3(n− 2)(3− n)
n+ 1
(1/2)n−1
µ
n− 3
n−3
2
¶
2f(0).
(a19)
The only negative term is (a19) (for n > 3). Thus the lower bound of (a16)
is at δ = 1, where,µ
∂2EVT−1(α)
∂α2
¶
α=0
n odd
=
µ
4f(0)
(n− 2)
n+ 1
(1/2)n−1
µ
n− 3
n−3
2
¶¶
(a20)µZ 1
0
u(v)dF (v)[(10− 2n) + 4f(0)(n− 3)]
¶
.
The first parenthesis in (a20) is always positive; the second is positive if
n = 3 or 5 but a restriction on f(0) is necessary for larger n:
f(0) >
(n− 5)
2(n− 3) .
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It follows that F (v) uniform (f(0) = 1/2) is suﬃcient to guarantee that
(a20) is positive for all n odd. Thus once again we can conclude that there
must exist some postive α such that EVT−1 > EWT−1and thus EV C0 (B
0) >
EW0 for all T > 1, establishing the result.
A.4 Derivation of the equilibrium and eﬃciency re-
sults in Table 2
A.4.1 Equilibrium cutpoints
Call st a realization of votes cast by all voters but i at time t, where st ∈ St,
the set of all possible realizations at t. There is no discounting and, to
minimize notation, vi1 > 0. Then if T = 2,
Eui|xi1 = u(vi1)
"X
s1∈Si
Pr(w|xi1, s1)Pr(s1)
#
+ (a21)
+W
"X
s2∈S2
Pr(w|3− (xi1 − 1), s2)Pr(s2)
#
,
where W ≡ 2
Z 100
0
u(v)dF (v) = 50. Call Sx,x+1t the set of votes’ realizations
by the other player at t such that i can change the outcome or induce a tie
by switching from x to x+1 votes. Taking into account that with probability
1/2 any other player agrees with i, it is not diﬃcult to verify that:
Pr(w|x+ 1, s)− Pr(w|x, s) =
½
0 if s /∈ Sx,x+1
1/4 if s ∈ Sx,x+1.
Comparing expected utilities for xi1 = 1, 2, 3, we derive the thresholds,
cα12 = 50
·
Pr(s2 ∈ S232 )
Pr(s1 ∈ S121 )
¸
(a22)
cα23 = 50
·
Pr(s2 ∈ S122 )
Pr(s1 ∈ S231 )
¸
. (a23)
The numerator of the term in square brackets in (a22) is the probability
that switching from 2 to 3 votes makes voter i pivotal at t = 2, i.e. the
probability of those votes realizations by the other players at t = 2 such that
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when casting 2 votes i either loses by 1 vote or the decision is tied. The other
probabilities can be read analogously.
With T = 2, a realization of votes at t = 1 implies the complementary
realization of votes at t = 2. Consider for example n = 2. In this case,
Pr(s1 ∈ S121 ) = Pr(xj = 1)t=1 + Pr(xj = 2)t=1, while Pr(s2 ∈ S232 ) = Pr(xj =
2)t=2 + Pr(xj = 3)t=2 = Pr(xj = 2)t=1 + Pr(xj = 1)t=1. Hence the term in
square brackets in equation (a22) always equals 1. But the same is true for
equation (a23): Pr(s2 ∈ S122 ) = Pr(xj = 1)t=2 + Pr(xj = 2)t=2 = Pr(xj =
3)t=1+Pr(xj = 2)t=1 = Pr(s1 ∈ S231 ). Thus the unique equilibrium thresholds
are independent of the other player’s strategy and satisfy c12 = c23 = 50. It
is never optimal to cast 2 votes over the first proposal, and the threshold at
which voting should switch from 1 to 3 votes equals 50, the mean valuation.
Suppose now that n is odd and all voters but i cast 2 votes. If they cast
2 votes at t = 1, they will cast 2 votes at t = 2. Then in both elections,
excluding i’s vote, either the outcome is tied, or the winning side has an
advantage of 2m votes, where m is an even number between 2 and n − 1.
Since i cannot cast more than 3 votes, the vote can only be pivotal if the
decision is tied, in which case any number of votes is equivalent. Thus casting
2 votes when everyone else does so is an equilibrium strategy: with n odd
and T = 2, there is an equilibrium with storable votes that replicates non-
storable votes. With T > 2 the statement does not hold: being able to
cast 2 votes on each proposal requires T bonus votes, and with more than 2
bonus votes casting 4 votes in one election becomes feasible, a strategy that
would increase the probability that i be pivotal and would be profitable for
suﬃciently high valuations.
With T = 2 and n odd, at least one other equilibrium exists. Suppose
that none of the voters other than i casts 2 votes. Then, excluding i, the
total number of votes cast in either election is even and either the outcome is
tied, or the winning side has an advantage of zm votes, wherem is, as above,
an even number between 2 and n− 1, and z ∈ {1, 3}. Thus Pr(s1 ∈ S121 ) =
Pr(s1 ∈ S231 ): i can aﬀect the outcome by switching from 1 to 2 votes only
if the winning side is ahead by exactly 2 votes; but this is also the only case
in which i can expect to aﬀect the outcome by switching from 2 to 3 votes.
Since the observation must hold in both periods, equations (a22) and (a23)
imply c12 = c23: there is an equilibrium where no-one casts 2 votes. We can
say something more about the equilibrium cutpoint at which a voter switches
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from 1 to 3 votes. It is given by:
cα13 = 50
·
Pr(s2 ∈ S132 )
Pr(s1 ∈ S131 )
¸
(a24)
If s is a realization of votes cast by all voters but i, call es its mirror image,
where for each voter j, esj = 4 − sj. The votes’ budget constraint and the
2 period horizon always imply that the probability of a given realization of
votes at t = 1 equals the probability of its mirror image at t = 2. Now,
consider a scenario where all other voters cast either 1 or 3 votes with equal
probability. Then Pr(s1 = s) = Pr(s1 = es) = Pr(s2 = s); and the term
in square brackets in equation (a24) equals 1. There is then an equilibrium
where c13 = 50, and the equal probability scenario is indeed self-consistent.
A.4.2 Eﬃcient yardstick
We define as ex-post eﬃcient a decision-making mechanism that resolves
each election in favor of the side with higher total utility from winning, or
higher aggregate valuations in the case of risk-neutrality. We then evaluate
the welfare properties of storable and non-storable votes as the expected ex
ante utility from the corresponding voting game, relative to the expected
utility from the eﬃcient mechanism. Consider for example the case n = 2,
with risk neutrality. For each proposal, half of the time the two voters agree,
and the expected valuation is 50; half of the times they disagree, and in the
ex post-eﬃcient resolution a voter wins only if his valuation is higher than
the other player’s. Hence for each proposal the expected utility from the
eﬃcient allocation is:
EU∗(2) =
1
2
50 +
1
2
ÃZ 100
0
Z 100
vj
vi
dvi
100
dvj
100
!
= 41.7 (a25)
When n = 3, ex post eﬃciency requires that a minority voter should
win if his valuation is higher than the sum of the other two players’. To
calculate a voter’s expected utility, recall that the distribution of the sum of
two random variables, each independently distributed uniformly over [0, 100],
is triangular. More precisely, suppose x, y and z are i.i.d. ∼ U [0, 100]. Then
w ≡ (y + z) is distributed over [0, 200] with density function,
f(w) =
½
w/(100)2 if w ≤ 100
(200− w)/(100)2 if w > 100.
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and, correspondingly, s ≡ y − z is distributed over [−100, 100] with density
function:
g(s) =
½
(100 + s)/(100)2 if s < 0
(100− s)/(100)2 if s > 0.
Thus:,
EU∗(3) =
1
4
50 +
1
4
µZ 100
0
(
Z 100
w
x
dx
100
)f(w)dw
¶
+ (a26)
+
1
2
·Z 0
−100
µZ 100
0
x
dx
100
¶
g(s)ds+
Z 100
0
µZ 100
s
x
dx
100
)g(s)ds
¶¸
= 38.5,
where the first term corresponds to voter i’s expected payoﬀ when all agree,
the second to i’s payoﬀ when neither of the other voters agrees, and the third
term, in square brackets, to the payoﬀ when one of the other voters agrees
with voter i.
We can calculate expected utility under ex-post eﬃciency in a similar
manner for diﬀerent numbers of voters, keeping in mind that the characteris-
tic function of a sum w of n random variables, each independently distributed
uniformly over [0, 100], is given by:
Pn(w) =
1
200(n− 1)!
nX
k=0
(−1)k
µ
n
k
¶
(
w − 100k
100
)n−1sign(w − 100k), (a27)
where sign(x) is the sign of x.
In contrast to storable votes, the expected eﬃcient payoﬀ has no temporal
dimension: given the assumed independent and identical distributions of the
valuations, the expected utility under ex-post eﬃciency is the same for all
proposals, and the expected utility from a sequence of T proposals is simply
the sum of T one-proposal expected utilities (appropriately discounted if δ
diﬀers from 1).
The expected utility from non-storable votes is equally constant across all
proposals and can be derived easily: it must equal the probability of having
the proposal decided in one’s preferred direction multiplied by the expected
utility from such an outcome, before the valuation has been observed. Re-
calling
R 100
0
u(v)dF (v) ≡W = 50, we can write,
EUns(n) = 50
n+I−1X
k=(n+I−1)/2
µ
n+ I − 1
k
¶µ
1
2
¶n+I−1
, (a28)
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where
I =
½
1 if n is even
0 if n is odd.
Thus for example, EUns(2) = EUns(3) = 37.5, and EUns(2)/EU∗(2) = 0.90,
EUns(3)/EU∗(3) = 0.97. Given the number of voters, the percentage of post-
eﬃcient utility that voters can expect to appropriate with non-storable votes
is constant and does not depend on the number of proposals.
Finally, if the decision is taken randomly, each voter always has a 50%
chance of obtaining the desired outcome, independently of the number of
voters, and expected utility from each proposal always equals 50/2 = 25.
B Three-proposal games: the second election
for the 2-voter game
Table B1 describes voter i’s equilibrium strategies in the second election, as
function of the bonus votes remaining to the two voters.
Table B1: Voter i’s equilibrium cutpoints
(n = 2, T = 3, t = 2, B0 = 3, δ = 1)
Bj = 0 Bj = 1 Bj = 2 Bj = 3
Bi = 1 (50) (50) (44) (50)
Bi = 2 (0, 100) (22, 89) (50, 50) (40, 60)
Bi = 3 (0, 0, 100), (0, 100, 100) (0, 50, 100) (34, 51, 75) (50, 50, 50)
There are 12 relevant states (and 4 additional trivial states, where i has
no bonus votes left and always casts 1 vote). The total number of votes
available equals the bonus votes still on hand plus 1; hence, for example, the
first row of Table B1 says that when i has 1 bonus vote, he should cast 1
vote for valuations lower than 50 and 2 votes for valuations above 50 if the
other player j has 0, 1 or 3 bonus votes left, and should use a cutpoint of 44
if j has 2 bonus votes left. (Recall that subjects are told how many bonus
votes remain available to the others.)
The equilibrium is very intuitive in the case of symmetrical states: in
these cases, the subgame is identical to the 2-proposal game and the dom-
inant strategy is to cast a single vote for valuations below the mean, and
all available votes for valuations above the mean. But equilibrium strategies
are much less intuitive in asymmetrical states, with one exception: when j
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has no bonus votes left and i has at least 2–the last two rows of the first
column–i can be sure to win both this election and the next by spreading
bonus votes–the voter should use at least 1 bonus vote in each election for
any valuation. Because i’s dominant strategy is straightforward in these two
states, we began by checking whether subjects did indeed choose it. We are
then immediately confronted with a predictable small sample problem: in
the 3-proposal 2-voter treatment we have data from 38 subjects, each play-
ing 30 rounds of the whole game, generating a total of 1140 data points for
each stage; but we have only 34 realizations of the two states that are of
interest here: ({2, 0}, t = 2) and ({3, 0}, t = 2). In 8 of these 34 realizations,
subjects did not play their dominant strategy; although the share of mistakes
is high, half of these mistakes occurred for absolute valuations lower than 10,
and an additional one at the first round of play. There was no diﬀerence in
the frequency of mistakes across populations (5/21 at Caltech and 3/13 at
UCLA), but, as would be the case with random errors, a higher frequency
for the first state as opposed to the second (6/18 vs. 2/16).
A second property we want to check is the monotonicity of the chosen
strategies–recall that for any state of the game best response strategies must
be monotonic, and thus monotonicity should continue to characterize voting
choices in the second election. But again, monotonicity should be checked
for each state and each subject, and the sample size will be a problem. Table
B1 suggests one instance in which the diﬃculty can be mitigated. As noted
earlier, when a voter holds 1 bonus vote, the optimal strategy is insensitive
to the number of bonus votes held by the other player (with one exception: a
valuation between 44 and 50 and an opponent with 2 bonus votes). We can
then aggregate all 1-bonus vote states for each voter (paying attention to the
possibility of the exception above). Out of a total of 38 subjects, 36 have
more than a single realization where they face the second election holding
1 bonus vote; for these 36, the number of such realizations per subject goes
from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 12, with a median and mean of
6. In only 2 of the 36 subjects do we observe any monotonicity violation:
an error rate of 2/12 in one case, and of 1/9 in the second. (In the whole
sample, there are two valuations between 44 and 50 with the other player
holding 2 bonus votes, and neither induces a violation of monotonicity). If
we aggregate the data over all subjects, ignoring their heterogeneity, the
error rate increases but still reaches only 25/240. (The aggregate error rate
excludes one observation where the other player holds 2 bonus votes and the
monotonicity violation follows from the equilibrium strategy.) Thus, even
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keeping in mind that there are now only two possible alternatives, the data
in these specific states appear to support monotonicity.
The multiplicity of possible states allows us to ask a new question: do
subjects condition their strategies on the budget of votes held by the others?
Theory says they should, as Table B1 makes clear. Consider for example the
last row in the table, when voter i holds 3 bonus votes: if the other player
holds 1 bonus vote, i should cast either 2 or 3 votes, with a cutpoint of 50;
but if the other player holds 3 bonus votes, then i should cast either 1 or 4
votes, again with a cutpoint of 50. What do the data show? Aggregating the
sample over all subjects and minimizing the number of monotonicity viola-
tions, we obtain the following cutpoints: (10, 74, 100) for the first state, and
(36, 63, 91) for the second (with the cutpoints at the lowest value compati-
ble with minimizing non-monotonicities). Once again, the cutpoints used by
subjects do not match exactly the theoretical values, but they tend to the
correct direction: in the first state, subjects never cast 4 votes, as theory
dictates, and very rarely cast 1, although the threshold where they switch
between 2 and 3 votes is too high; in the second state they did cast 1 and 4
votes, as they should in equilibrium, but they also cast 2 and 3 votes with
comparable cumulative frequency, contrary to the theoretical prediction.
C Likelihood functions
C.1 Logit equilibrium likelihood function
For each model (behavior strategy or cutpoint strategy), we compute the
logit equilibrium correspondence as a function of the precision parameter,
λ. To obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of λ given a dataset (from a
session) we can compute the likelihood of observing the data for each value ofeλ, for each model, under the maintained hypothesis that the model is correct
and eλ is the true value of λ. This gives us a likelihood function (as a function
of λ) that is directly implied by the structure of the model.
Consider some set of data points from a session with some fixed value
of n and T = 2. Denote by σ∗bλ the quantal response equilibrium of the
game for this value of n and λ = bλ. For each individual, i, in the session
we have a collection of K observations of proposal 1 valuations and bonus
vote choices, denoted yi = (v1i1, b
1
i1, . . . , v
K
i1 , b
K
i1). For any round, k, and any
individual, i, the equilibrium specifies probabilities that individual i uses 0,
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1, or 2 bonus votes for the first proposal as a function of i’s first proposal
value in that round. Denote these by σ∗bλ0 (vki1), σ∗bλ1 (vki1), and σ∗bλ2 (vki1). (These
probabilities are assumed to be independent across individuals and across
rounds). Letting y = (y1, . . . , yi, . . . , yI), the log likelihood function, given bλ,
is,
L(y|bλ) = IX
i=1
KX
k=1
ln pr(bki1|vki1, bλ) = IX
i=1
KX
k=1
ln(σ∗
bλ
bki1
(vki1)|bλ).
The maximum likelihood estimate, bλ, is just the value of λ that maximizes
this likelihood function for the given dataset. This is computed for each
session and for each model.
C.2 ABF likelihood function
The estimation of the ABF model involves the estimation of three param-
eters: two cutpoints, c12, c23, and an error rate, . The likelihood function
is constructed in the following way. For each individual, i, we have a col-
lection of K observations of proposal 1 valuations and bonus vote choices,
denoted yi = (v1i1, b
1
i1, . . . , v
K
i1 , b
K
i1): The log likelihood of this observation,
given cutpoint and error parameter estimates, bc12, bc23, and b, is given by:,
L(yi|bc12,bc23,b) = KX
k=1
ln pr(bki1|vki1,bc12,bc23,b),
where
Pr(bki1|vki1,bc12,bc23,b) = 1−b if
vki1 ∈ (0,bc12] and bki1 = 0 or
vki1 ∈ [bc12,bc23] and bki1 = 1 or
vki1 ∈ [bc23, 1] and bki1 = 2,
and
Pr(vki1, b
k
i1|bc12,bc23,b) = b2 if
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vki1 ∈ (0, c12] and bki1 = 1 or
vki1 ∈ (0,bc12] and bki1 = 2 or
vki1 ∈ [bc12,bc23] and bki1 = 0 or
vki1 ∈ [bc12,bc23] and bki1 = 2 or
vki1 ∈ [bc23, 1] and bki1 = 0 or
vki1 ∈ [bc23, 1] and bki1 = 1.
D Sample instructions for a 2-person, 2-proposal
session
This is an experiment in group decision making. You will be paid for your
participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Diﬀerent participants
may earn diﬀerent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and
all interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is
important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other
participants during the experiment.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction
period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will
be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out
loud so that everyone can hear. If any diﬃculties arise after the experiment
has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
The experiment you are participating in is a voting experiment, where
you will be asked to allocate a budget of several votes over two successive
elections. We will have a practice session before we proceed to the paid
session. The paid session will consist of 30 rounds. Each round will have two
elections, and you will receive a new budget of votes at the beginning of each
round.
At the end of the paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you
have earned in each of the 30 rounds, plus a show-up fee of $5.00. Everyone
will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how
much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in
francs. Your dollar earnings are determined by multiplying your earnings in
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francs by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is 0.007,
meaning that 100 francs is worth $0.70.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT
At the beginning of the first match, you will be randomly divided into 6
groups with 2 persons in each group. Each group follows exactly the same
rules, but what happens in your group has no eﬀect on the members of the
other groups, and vice versa. You and the other member of your group will
vote on two diﬀerent proposals, in sequence. You will cast one “regular” vote
in each election. In addition, you will be given 2 “bonus votes” that you will
be able to add to your regular votes in any way you wish.
The first proposal your group votes on is called Proposal A. You may cast
up to 3 votes in the A election, your regular A vote plus either 0, 1, or 2 of
your bonus votes. Before making a decision of how many votes to cast, you
will be assigned your personal Proposal A Value, which is equally likely to be
any integer amount between −100 and 100 francs, but not zero. The other
member of your group is also randomly assigned his or her own Proposal A
value, which is equally likely to be any integer amount between −100 and
100 francs, but not zero. Because the values are random, you and the other
member of your group will usually have diﬀerent values. You are not told
what his or her value is. The other member of your group may also cast up
to 3 votes in the A election. This is indicated on your screen where it says,
“Other’s available votes for current proposal.”
If your value is positive, you are in favor of Proposal A and earn your
value if and only if A passes. If your A value is negative, you are against
proposal A and earn the absolute value of your value if and only if A does
not pass. Otherwise you earn 0 francs. For example, if your proposal A value
is —55, then you earn 55 francs if A does not pass, and 0 francs if A passes.
Proposal A passes in your group if there are more YES votes than NO votes
cast by members of your group. Proposal A fails in your group if there are
more NO votes than YES votes cast by members of your group. Ties are
broken randomly by the computer.
After being told your proposal A value, you must decide whether to cast
1 vote, 2 votes, or 3 votes in the proposal A election. If you are in favor
of A (that is, your proposal A value is positive), any votes you cast will be
automatically counted as YES votes for A. If you are against A (that is,
your proposal A value is negative), any votes you cast will be automatically
counted as NO votes. Whatever bonus votes you do not use in the A election,
will be saved for you to use in the B election. For example, if you cast 1 vote
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in the A election, both your bonus votes will be saved. If you cast 2 votes in
the A election, only 1 of your bonus votes will be saved. If you cast 3 votes
in the A election, none of your bonus votes will be saved. You will be told
how the other member of your group voted in the proposal A election after
you have made your voting decision.
After you and the other member of your group have made voting decisions,
you are both told the outcome of your group’s proposal A election. You then
proceed to the proposal B election. You are grouped with the same member
in the proposal B election as you were grouped with for the proposal A
election.
When you and the other member of your group are ready to proceed,
each of you will be randomly assigned proposal B values in the same manner
that your proposal A values were assigned. Again, because the values are
random, they will typically be diﬀerent from each other and diﬀerent from
your proposal A values. You are not told what the proposal B value of the
other member of your group is. Your screen will display how many votes
the other member of your group has left over from the A election. This is
indicated on your screen where it says “Other’s available votes for current
proposal.”
You will then cast your regular B vote, plus all of your remaining bonus
votes by clicking on the “vote” button. These votes will automatically be
cast as YES votes for proposal B if your B value is greater than 0 and as NO
votes if your B value is less than 0. Your group’s outcome of the B election
is then reported to you. You do not have any choice about how many votes
to cast in the B election. The number of votes you cast in the B election is
equal to one plus the number of bonus votes you saved from the A election.
When everyone has finished we will go to the next match. In the next
match, you will be reassigned into new groups of 2 persons each, and will
repeat the procedure described above. This will continue for 30 matches.
PRACTICE SESSION
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a short
practice session. Do you have any questions before we begin the practice
session?
[ANSWER QUESTIONS]
You will not be paid for this session; it is just to allow you to get familiar
with the experiment and your computers. During the practice session, do
not press any keys or click with your mouse, unless instructed to. When we
instruct you, please do exactly as we ask. Go ahead and double click on the
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icon that says “MULTISTAGE CLIENT.”
FIRST SCREEN (Display screen-shot of their current screen on the video
projector.)
Please enter your first and last name, click OK/SUBMIT, and wait for
further instructions.
SECOND SCREEN (Display screen-shot of their current screen on the
video projector.)
This is the decision screen. The match number, the current proposal, the
number of voters in your group (which is always 2 in this experiment), and
your ID# are listed at the top of the screen. At the bottom of this screen is
a table that will contain the history of all elections that you participate in.
Since there have been no elections yet, it is blank. (Experimenter points to
the appropiate areas of the screen on the projected image in the front of the
room.)
Go ahead and open your envelope. You should have two record sheets.
Please record your ID number at the top of your record sheets. Please
record your proposal A value on your record sheet in the row labeled “Practice
1 A.” Then choose how many votes you want to cast in the A election, by
clicking on the up or down arrows next to the number of votes. You may
cast either 1, 2, or 3 votes in this election. Any unused votes in this election
will be saved for you to use in the B election of this match.
If your proposal A value is positive, then all votes you cast will count as
YES votes for A, and if your proposal A value is negative, then all votes you
cast will count as NO votes. When you have selected the number of votes
you wish to cast in this election, please click on the “vote” button. Please
record the number of votes you cast on your record sheet. Then wait for all
other participants in the room to finish casting their Proposal A votes.
THIRD SCREEN (Display screen-shot of their current screen on the video
projector.)
Once everyone has made their vote decision for the A election, the votes
are tallied and the results for your group are displayed on your screen. The
screen displays the number of YES votes and the number of NO votes cast
by each member of your group. Please record these numbers on your record
sheet. The proposal passes if there are more YES votes than NO votes. Tie
votes are broken randomly by the computer. The outcome for your group is
displayed on your screen. Please record the outcome on your record sheet.
The screen also displays your earnings from the A election. Please record
this number on your record sheet. This screen also displays your cumulative
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earnings so far in the experiment, which you do not need to record. Please
press OK when you are ready to proceed to the proposal B election.
FOURTH SCREEN (Display screen-shot of their current screen on the
video projector.)
We are now in the B election. You will not make any choices in the B
election. Your voting decision is completely determined by how many votes
you cast in the A election. But you will need to read the information on
the screen and record it. Please record your proposal B value on your record
sheet in the row labeled “Practice 1 B.” This screen reminds you how many
votes you have remaining. Please record this number on your record sheet in
the column labeled “your vote.” This number equals the number of bonus
votes you did not use for proposal A, plus one additional vote. When you
have recorded all the information, click on the “Vote” button. All these votes
are now automatically cast by the computer. They are recorded as YES votes
for proposal B if your B value is positive, and as NO votes if your B value is
negative.
FIFTH SCREEN (Display screen-shot of their current screen on the video
projector.)
Once everyone has voted in the B election, the votes are tallied and the
results for your group are displayed on your screen. The screen displays the
number of YES votes and the number of NO votes cast by each voter in
your group. Please record these numbers. Proposal B passes in your group
if there are more YES votes than NO votes cast by voters in your group. Tie
votes are broken randomly by the computer. The outcome for your group is
displayed on your screen. Please record the outcome on your record sheet.
The screen displays your earnings from the B election. Please record
this number on your record sheet. This screen also displays your cumulative
earnings so far in the experiment, which you do not need to record.
We have now completed the first practice match. We will now proceed
to the second practice match. Remember that you will be regrouped with a
new participant in this match. This regrouping is done between every match
in the experiment, and is determined randomly by the computer. Please
complete the second practice match by following the same directions as in
the first practice match. Don’t forget to record the information as it appears
on the screen. Remember, you are not paid for these practice matches. Feel
free to raise your hand if you have any questions.
When everyone has made their vote decisions for proposal A and proposal
B in this practice match, the practice session will be over.
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Your total earnings for the practice session are displayed on this screen in
FRANCS and DOLLARS. Since it is a practice match, the DOLLAR amount
equals 0. You do not need to record this because it is a practice match. But
at the end of the experiment, it is essential that you record both of these
numbers on your record sheet. Please click on the done button and wait for
the experiment to begin
Any questions? [ANSWER QUESTIONS]
Please pull out your dividers so we can begin the paid session of the
experiment
PROCEED THROUGH PAID MATCHES 1—30
END OF EXPERIMENT PROTOCOL
This completes the experiment. Please make sure to record your total
payoﬀs on your record sheet, including your show-up fee of $5.00. Please
remain in your seat. Do not talk with the other participants or play with the
computers. We will come by to check your total. We will pay each of you
in private in the next room in the order of your ID numbers. Please take all
belongings with you when you leave to receive payment. You are under no
obligation to reveal your earnings to the other players. Thank you for your
participation.
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 Vertical lines show estimated cutpoints, and curves show expected responses from fitted robust logit models
                                  Figure 4
   Data from some example individuals (n=2, T=2)
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 Figure 5
       Empirical votes for 2-proposal experiments
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Figure  6
       Histograms of individual persons' error rates
                         2-proposal experiments
(cutpoints estimated to minimize each person's error rate)
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Figure 7
Histograms of individual persons' error rates, early and late trials
                                2-proposal experiments
2 player games(Caltech students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
5
10
15
2 player games(UCLA students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
3 player games(Caltech students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
3 player games(UCLA students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
5
10
15
6 player games(Caltech students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
4
8
6 player games(UCLA students)
Avg error distance
0 5 10 20 30
0
4
8
 Figure  8
Histograms of individual persons' average error distances, by university
                                         2-proposal experiments
      (cutpoints estimated to minimize each person's average error distance)
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Figure 9
Individuals' cutpoints, estimated to minimize error rates
                       2-proposal experiments
         (circles show theoretical equilibrium values)
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Figure  10
               Histograms of individual persons' error rates
                             3-proposal experiments
(cutpoints estimated to minimize each person's error rate)
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                         Figure 11
Empirical votes for 3-proposal experiments
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                Figure 12
Empirical votes,  3 bonus votes
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Figure 14 
Isopayoff curves. 
n=2, T=2.
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Fig. 14.1.  The opponent plays the equilibrium strategy.
Each contour is a loss of  0.75 percent, relative to ex post efficiency.
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Fig 14.2.  The opponent plays the average estimated strategy. 
The isopayoff curve corresponds to the equilibrium payoff.
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Figure  15
Expected number of votes in the two QRE models
                    
 
 
 
 
    Session c1
The darker curve is estimated from the behavior strategies model, the lighter curve from 
the cutpoint strategies model.
Figure 16 
QRE estimated choice frequencies
Behavior strategies on left. Cutpoint strategies on right 
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